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TRACKING TERRORIST FINANCING THROUGH
SWIFT: WHEN U.S. SUBPOENAS AND FOREIGN
PRIVACY LAW COLLIDE
PatrickM. Connorton*
This Note examines the jurisprudence surroundingproduction orders
that require the ordered party to violate foreign law, using the Terrorist
Finance Tracking Program-better known as the SWIFT Program-asa
case study. This Note recommends that courts excuse or punish
noncompliance with such production orders based solely on the good or
badfaith acts of the orderedparty. Although this approach will clarify the
law in this area, in certain circumstances it may make it more difficult for
the United States to obtain information abroad. Consequently, this Note
urges the United States to pursueformal and informal information-sharing
agreements with its allies in the war on terror.
INTRODUCTION

We are caught between complying with the U.S. and European rules, and
it's a train wreck.I
-Leonard
Schrank, Chief Executive Officer of the Society for
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication
Since the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon, the United States has made tracking terrorist financing a top
priority. 2 The most ambitious of these efforts is the Terrorist Finance
Tracking Program, more commonly known as the SWIFT Program. 3 Under
the SWIFT Program, the U.S. Treasury uses administrative subpoenas to
access the vast database of financial information gathered by the Society for

* J.D. Candidate, 2008, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2003, Williams College.
I would like to thank Professor Daniel Richman for his invaluable help and guidance.
1. Dan Bilefsky, Belgians Say Banking Group Broke EuropeanRules in Giving Data to
U.S., N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 2006, at A10.

2. Nat'l Comm'n on Terrorist Attacks upon the U.S., The 9/11 Commission Report 382
(2004) ("Vigorous efforts to track terrorist financing must remain front and center in U.S.
counterterrorism efforts.").
3. See, e.g., Tony Snow, Press Sec'y, White House, Press Briefing (Sept. 27, 2006),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060927-2.html (calling

the program the "SWIFT Program").
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Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), 4 a Belgiumbased banking cooperative that supplies messaging services to thousands of
financial institutions around the world.5 Those familiar with SWIFT's
database have dubbed it "'the mother lode, the Rosetta stone' for financial
data." 6 Stuart Levey, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and
Financial Intelligence, has called the counterterrorism benefits of accessing
'7
this information "incalculable."
Unfortunately, until June 2007, in order to grant the United States access
to its financial records, SWIFT had to violate Belgian and E.U. privacy
laws prohibiting the transfer of personal data to nations with relatively lax
privacy laws, such as the United States. 8 It was not until U.S. newspapers
exposed the formerly classified SWIFT Program in the summer of 2006,
however, that Belgian and E.U. officials became aware of these violations. 9
Though SWIFT argued that it had complied with all relevant privacy
regulations,' 0 Belgian and E.U. data protection authorities harshly
reprimanded the group and demanded that it stop complying with the U.S.
subpoenas.I' SWIFT subsequently found itself in the unenviable position
of deciding whether to comply with U.S. law or Belgian and E.U. law.12
4. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Testimony of Stuart Levey (July 11,
2006), availableat http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp05.htm.
5. See Swift.com, About SWIFT, http://www.swift.com/index.cfm?item-id=43232
(last visited July 28, 2007). For further discussion of the Society for Worldwide Interbank
Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), see infra Part I.A.
6. Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Bank Data Sifted in Secret by U.S. to Block Terror,
N.Y. Times, June 23, 2006, at Al (quoting a former government official).
7. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 4.
8. See Royaume de Belgique Commission de la Protection de la Vie Privee, Opinion
No. 37/2006, Opinion on the Transfer of Personal Data by the CSLR SWIFT by Virtue of
UST (OFAC) Subpoenas 26 (2006) (nonofficial and temporary translation) [hereinafter
Belgian
Opinion],
available
at
http://www.privacycommission.be/communiquE9s/opinion_37-2006.pdf
(detailing
SWIFT's violations of Belgian and E.U. law); Press Release, European Union Article 29
Working Party, Press Release on the SWIFT Case, (Nov. 23, 2006), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice-home/fsj/privacy/news/docs/PRSwiftAffair_23 11 06 en.pdf
(same). Note that, while technically distinct, Belgian and E.U. privacy laws overlap to the
extent that Belgium has implemented E.U. directives. See Press Release, European Union
Article 29 Working Party, supra ("SWIFT is subject to Belgian data protection law
implementing the EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC."); see also European
Commission, Status of Implementation of Directive 95/46 on the Protection of Individuals
with
Regard
to
the
Processing
of
Personal
Data,
http://ec.europa.eu/justice home/fsj/privacy/law/implementation-en.htm (last visited July
28, 2007) (outlining Belgium's implementation of relevant E.U. privacy directives).
9. See, e.g., Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 6; Josh Meyer & Greg Miller, U.S. Secretly
Tracks Global Bank Data, L.A. Times, June 23, 2006, at Al; Glenn R. Simpson, Treasury
Tracks FinancialData in Secret Program,Wall St. J., June 23, 2006, at At.
10. Swifl.com, SWIFT Statement on Compliance Policy (June 23, 2006),
http://www.swift.com/index.cfm?itemid=59897.
11. See Belgian Opinion, supra note 8, at 25 (calling SWIFT's compliance with U.S.
subpoenas "a serious error of judgment"); Press Release, European Union Article 29
Working Party, supra note 8 (stating that SWIFT had violated "fundamental European
principles" as well as Belgian and E.U. law); see also, Bilefsky, supra note 1 (noting that
Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt "took Swift to task for passing on confidential
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SWIFT remained tom between these conflicting obligations until June
27, 2007, when the United States and the European Union reached an
agreement (the U.S.-E.U. Compromise) that allowed the SWIFT Program to
continue operating in modified form. 13 Under the U.S.-E.U. Compromise,
the United States agreed to use information obtained from SWIFT only for
counterterrorism purposes and to retain the information for no longer than
five years.14
The trials and tribulations of the SWIFT Program highlight a problem
that continuously threatens U.S. initiatives in the war on terror: The United
States' unquenchable thirst for information and intelligence often puts it at
odds with countries that highly value privacy, such as most European
nations. This clash of principles explains, among other examples, the
dispute between the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the
European Union over the use of air-passenger manifests by U.S.
intelligence agencies. 15 As evidenced by the recent agreement regarding
the SWIFT Program, compromise is a potential solution to such clashes.
But what if the cost of compromise is too high? Can the United States
simply gather the desired information unilaterally? In the case of the
SWIFT Program, could the United States have brought SWIFT before a
U.S. court and demanded compliance with its subpoenas even though doing
so would require SWIFT to violate foreign law?
The answer depends, in part, on where the suit is brought. Over the past
fifty years, U.S. courts have taken wide-ranging positions on orders that
require a party to violate foreign law. 16 Initially, some courts took the

financial information without adequate safeguards that European privacy rules would be
respected").
12. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
13. See Press Release, Europa, USA to Take Account of EU Data Protection Principles
to
Process
Data
Received
from
Swift
(June 28, 2007),
available at
http://www.europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/968&format-HTML&
aged=0&Ianguage=EN&guiLanguage=en; see also Ingrid Melander, E. U. Approves Dealfor
U.S. Use of Banking Data in Anti-Terrorism Probes, Wash. Post, June 28, 2007, at A21;
James Risen, U.S. Reaches Tentative Deal with Europe on Bank Data, N.Y. Times, June 29,
2007, at A6.
14. See Press Release, Europa, supra note 13.
15. See Jane Perlez, U.S. Asks Europe to Ensure Continued Access to Air Passenger
Data, N.Y. Times, May 14, 2007, at A3 ("In order to reduce the odds that terrorists will
enter the United States, the Bush administration is asking the European Union to lift its
objections to the sharing of airline passenger information with American intelligence
agencies, said the secretary of homeland security, Michael Chertoff.").
16. See generally Mark Brodeur, Note, Court Ordered Violations of Foreign Bank
Secrecy and Blocking Laws: Solving the ExtraterritorialDilemma, 1988 U. Ill. L. Rev. 563;
Lenore B. Browne, Note, ExtraterritorialDiscovery: An Analysis Based on Good Faith, 83
Colum. L. Rev. 1320 (1983); Karen A. Feagle, Note, ExtraterritorialDiscovery: A Social
Contract Perspective, 7 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 297 (1996); Daniela Levarda, Note, A
Comparative Study of U.S. and British Approaches to Discovery Conflicts: Achieving a
Uniform System of ExtraterritorialDiscovery, 18 Fordham Int'l L.J. 1340 (1995); Thomas
Scott Murley, Note, Compelling Production of Documents in Violation of Foreign Law: An
Examination and Reevaluation of the American Position, 50 Fordham L. Rev. 877 (1982).
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position that such orders should never be enforced, 17 while others required
the ordered party to make a good faith effort to comply. 18 Today, courts
have largely abandoned these per se rules. Instead, courts now employ a
balancing test that weighs, among other things, the conflicting national
interests at stake and the hardship imposed on the ordered party. 19 Courts
differ, however, on how best to balance the relevant factors. 20 Some courts
have even 1suggested that meaningfully balancing these factors is
2
impossible.
Courts today also consider the extent to which the ordered party has
acted in good or bad faith in determining whether sanctions, such as fines or
default judgments, are appropriate for noncompliance.2 2 Again, courts
disagree on what qualifies as good or bad faith and what significance, if
any, good or bad faith should have in determining sanctions for
noncompliance with an order that requires violation of foreign law.
This Note examines U.S. courts' treatment of orders that require
violation of foreign law using the SWIFT Program as a case study. This
Note argues that the balancing test used to determine whether to enforce
such orders has proven unworkable. Instead, this Note encourages courts to
look solely to the good or bad faith acts of the ordered party. Since this
approach will make it difficult for the United States to unilaterally gather
information under certain circumstances, formal agreements like the U.S.E.U. Compromise will become increasingly important. However, this Note
argues that the United States should also make use of more informal
agreements that offer greater flexibility.
17. See, e.g., In re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611, 613 (2d Cir. 1962) (holding
that courts should not cause violations of foreign law); Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149, 152
(2d Cir. 1960) (same); First Nat'l City Bank of N.Y. v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616, 619 (2d Cir.
1959) (same).
18. See, e.g., Gen. Atomic Co. v. Exxon Nuclear Co., 90 F.R.D. 290, 296 (S.D. Cal.
1981).
19. See Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1474-75 (9th
Cir. 1992) (conducting a balancing test to determine the validity of an order requiring
violation of foreign law); Reinsurance Co. of Am. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 902
F.2d 1275, 1279-83 (7th Cir. 1990) (same); United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404, 407 (5th
Cir. 1976) (same); Trade Dev. Bank v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 35, 41 (2d Cir. 1972)
(same); United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 902 (2d Cir. 1968) (same);
Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, 231 F.R.D. 538, 542-43 (N.D. Il1. 2004) (same); see also
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 442 cmt. g (1987) (advocating the use of a
balancing test); Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law § 40 (1965) (same).
20. These differences are discussed at length in Part II.A.3.
21. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom, Ltd., 480 F. Supp 1138, 1148 (N.D. Ill.
1979) (calling the balancing test "inherently unworkable").
22. See Societe Intemationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 208-09 (1958) (evaluating the ordered party's good and bad faith
acts); United States v. Bank of N.S., 740 F.2d 817, 825-26 (11 th Cir. 1984) (same); United
States v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341, 346 (7th Cir. 1983) (same); United
States v. Vetco, Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1287 (9th Cir. 1981) (same); In re Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992, 998 (10th Cir. 1977) (same); Trade Dev.
Bank, 469 F.2d at 40-41 (same); SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 117
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (same).
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Part I of this Note introduces the SWIFT Program and addresses
Belgium's and the European Union's findings that the program forced
SWIFT to violate their laws.
Part I also discusses the U.S.-E.U.
Compromise, which will keep the SWIFT Program operational in modified
form.
Part II examines the case law regarding orders that require violation of
foreign law. Part II.A traces the evolution of U.S. courts' approach to such
orders, focusing on the development of the balancing test. This history
explains the terms of the current debate and details the conflicting
approaches courts take. Part II.B examines the good faith standard and the
varying degrees of significance that courts attach to good or bad faith acts.
Part II.C discusses various attempts to circumvent the problems posed by
orders requiring violation of foreign law with formal and informal
international agreements.
Part III argues that a noncompliant party's good or bad faith acts in
response to an order requiring violation of foreign law ought to be the sole
factor in determining whether sanctions are appropriate for noncompliance.
This part concludes that, under this approach, the United States would have
been unable to compel SWIFT to comply with its subpoenas. As such, Part
III encourages the United States to employ both formal and informal
information-sharing agreements with its allies in the war on terror.
I. SWIFT AND THE SWIFT PROGRAM
This part gives background information on both SWIFT and the SWIFT
Program. Part L.A traces the history of SWIFT, explaining its importance to
the banking and finance industries. Part I.B addresses the development and
operation of the SWIFT Program and details foreign objections to the
program, focusing on Belgium's and the European Union's findings that the
SWIFT Program violated their laws. Part I.B also discusses the U.S.-E.U.
Compromise that will keep the SWIFT Program operational.
A. SWIFT
In 1973, a group of 239 banks from 15 different countries founded
SWIFT as a financial-industry-owned cooperative in Brussels, Belgium.
Through SWIFT, the banks hoped to create "a shared worldwide data
processing and communications link and a common language for
international financial transactions." 23 More specifically, they envisioned
SWIFT as a network to carry messages containing instructions for
international transfers of money between banks. 24 Today, SWIFT has
nearly 2300 member organizations in 208 countries and provides transfer
23. Swift.com, SWIFT History, http://www.swift.com/index.cfm?itemid=1243 (last
visited July 27, 2007).
24. See Meyer & Miller, supra note 9. SWIFT does not actually execute the transfer of
funds, but merely communicates relevant instructions to the banks that do. See id. It is not a
bank and does not hold accounts of customers. Swift.com, supra note 10.
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instructions to 8147 financial institutions. 25 Its network carries up to 12.7
million messages a day.2 6 "[V]irtually every major commercial bank, as
well as brokerage houses, fund managers and stock exchanges, uses its
services."

27

B. The SWIFT Program
1. Creation and Operation
After the September 11 th terrorist attacks, the Bush administration made
"cut[ting] off the flow of money to Al Qaeda," and similar organizations, a

top priority. 28 On September 23, 2001, pursuant to the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, 29 President George W. Bush signed
Executive Order 13224, declaring a national emergency to deal with the
threat of terrorism. 30
The declared emergency granted the Treasury
Department's Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) authority to issue
administrative subpoenas to obtain financial records related to terrorism
3
investigations. 1
Shortly after President Bush signed Executive Order 13224, OFAC
began using its new administrative subpoena powers on SWIFT in a secret
effort that developed into the SWIFT Program. 32 OFAC can subpoena
SWIFT because "SWIFT has substantial business and operations in the
United States, including data storage." 33 By September 29, 2006, sixty-four

25. Swift.com,
SWIFT
in
Figures
(May
14,
2007),
http://www.swift.com/index.cfm?item-id=61915.
26. Meyer & Miller, supra note 9.
27. Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 6.
28. See id.; Meyer & Miller, supra note 9.
29. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (2000).
30. See Fact Sheet, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Executive Order
13224 (Dec. 20, 2002), availableat http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2002/16181.htm.
31. See Meyer & Miller, supra note 9 ("The [Office of Foreign Asset Control's]
administrative subpoenas are issued under authority granted in the 1977 International
Emergency Economic Powers Act."); Press Release, supra note 4 ("The legal basis for this
subpoena is the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), a statute passed in
1977, which allows the government to compel the production of information pursuant to
Presidential declarations of national emergency .... In this case, our subpoena is issued
pursuant to President Bush's declaration of an emergency with respect to terrorism after
September 11 th in Executive Order 13224.").
32. See Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 6 (noting that the first administrative subpoenas
were issued "[wlithin weeks of 9/11"). The idea to target SWIFT "grew out of a suggestion
by a Wall Street executive, who told a senior Bush administration official about Swift's
database." Id. Before then, "[flew government officials knew much about the consortium...
but they quickly discovered it offered unparalleled access to international transactions." Id.
33. Swift.com, Update and Q&A to SWIFT's 23 June 2006 Statement on Compliance
(Aug. 25, 2006), http://www.swift.com/index.cfm?itemid=60275; see also Belgian Opinion
supra note 8, at 3 (noting that one of SWIFT's two "operation centres" is in the United
States). A detailed analysis of U.S. jurisdiction over SWIFT is beyond the scope of this
Note. It warrants mentioning, though, that no one has challenged the SWIFT Program on
jurisdictional grounds, particularly not SWIFT itself.
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administrative subpoenas had been served on SWIFT, 34 generally at
These subpoenas allowed OFAC to retrieve
monthly intervals. 35
customers' names, bank account numbers, addresses, phone numbers, and
36
other identifying information.
The physical transfer of information and documents from SWIFT to
OFAC took place in two phases. 3 7 First, messages subject to the SWIFT
Program's subpoenas were delivered from SWIFT's operation center in the
United States to the U.S. Treasury, where they were stored in a "black box"
or "production database. ' 38 Next, OFAC used software to search the
production database for predetermined names related to terrorism
investigations. 39 OFAC conducted these searches in collaboration with the
Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other
interested agencies. 40 According to Stuart Levey, Under Secretary of the
Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, "tens of thousands" of
41
such searches were conducted during the first five years of the program.
U.S. intelligence agencies analyzed information gleaned from these
searches "to detect patterns, shifts in strategy, specific 'hotspot4 2accounts,'
and locations that had become new havens for terrorist activity."
The scope of the SWIFT Program was not unlimited, however. 43 For
example, before conducting a search, analysts first had to "articulate[] the
specific link between the target of the search and a terrorism
investigation." 44
Search requests were also reviewed by the U.S.
Treasury's assistant secretary for intelligence and were subject to oversight
by an outside auditor. 45 Furthermore, "SWIFT officials [were] ...allowed
34. Belgian Opinion, supra note 8, at 5.
35. See Meyer & Miller, supra note 9.
36. Id.; see also Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 6 (calling SWIFT's database "a rich
hunting ground for government investigators"); Simpson, supra note 9.
37. See Belgian Opinion, supra note 8, at 5.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 6.
40. See Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 6; Meyer & Miller, supra note 9.
41. Meyer & Miller, supra note 9.
42. Id.
43. Actually, at the outset, there were few if any limitations on the program. See
Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 6 ("'At first, they got everything-the entire Swift database,'
one person close to the operation said.").
44. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 4. "[T]here had been one
instance of abuse in which an analyst had conducted a search that did not meet the terroristrelated criteria. The analyst was subsequently denied access to the database." Meyer &
Miller, supra note 9.
45. Meyer & Miller, supra note 9 ("A SWIFT representative said that Booz Allen
Hamilton, an international consulting firm, is the auditor but provided no further details on
how the oversight process works."). More details regarding Booz Allen Hamilton's role
emerged during Belgium's investigation of SWIFT:
A continuous audit by the American auditor Booz, Allen & Hamilton was
provided for as of the middle of 2002. This concerns end-to-end audits of the
[U.S. Treasury's] system to provide SWIFT with additional assurance that the
system was secure (checking the conformity with [International Organization for
Standardization] standards on security), that the purpose was limited to terrorism
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to be present when analysts search[ed] the data and to raise objections with
46
top officials."
2. Reaction to the SWIFT Program in the United States
On June 23, 2006, The New York Times, Los Angeles Times, and The
Wall Street Journalpublished stories revealing the existence of the SWIFT
Initially, critics likened the program to the Bush
Program. 4 7
administration's controversial use of warrantless wiretaps. 48 Some of those
who leaked information regarding the SWIFT Program did so out of
concerns "that they were exploiting a 'gray area' in the law" and might be
violating Fourth Amendment protections against illegal searches and
program's use of administrative
Critics considered the
seizures. 49
50
subpoenas particularly problematic.
Members of the Bush administration quickly defended the program,
calling it "a vital tool" in the war on terror. 5 1 Supporters pointed to specific
successes of the SWIFT Program: the capture of Hambali, the mastermind
of the 2002 resort bombing in Bali; 52 the conviction of Brooklyn resident
Uzair Parchara on terrorism-related charges; 53 and, generally, the SWIFT

investigations, that the scrutinizers . . . had access to everything the [U.S.
Treasury] analysts were inquiring and to force continuing improvements to the
system.
Belgian Opinion, supra note 8, at 7.
46. Meyer & Miller, supra note 9; see also Belgian Opinion, supra note 8, at 7
(discussing the role of SWIFT officials on-site at the U.S. Treasury). It is unclear what
weight SWIFT's objections would carry. As SWIFT takes pains to point out on its web site,
SWIFT is not volunteering information to the United States but rather is being compelled to
produce it through administrative subpoenas. See Swift.com, supra note 33.
47. See Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 6; Meyer & Miller, supra note 9; Simpson, supra
note 9.
48. See, e.g., Editorial, Following the Money, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, June 26, 2006, at
B8 ("To the list of the Bush administration's constitutionally dubious efforts to track
terrorism suspects now add tapping international banking records without judicial
subpoena."); Editorial, Following the Money, and the Rules, N.Y. Times, June 24, 2006, at
A14; Meyer & Miller, supra note 9 ("[The SWIFT Program] is part of an arsenal of
aggressive measures the government has adopted since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks that
yield new intelligence, but also circumvent traditional safeguards against abuse and raise
concerns about intrusions on privacy.").
49. Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 6.
50. See, e.g., id. (referring to the use of administrative subpoenas as a "significant
departure from typical practice in how the government acquires Americans' financial
records"); Meyer & Miller, supra note 9 (calling it "a major departure from traditional
methods of obtaining financial records").
51. John Ward Anderson, Belgium Rules Sifting of Bank Data Illegal, Wash. Post, Sept.
29, 2006, at A14.
52. See Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 6 ("The Swift data identified a previously
unknown figure in Southeast Asia who had financial dealings with a person suspected of
being a member of Al Qaeda; that link helped locate Hambali in Thailand in 2003 .... ").
53. See id. (describing Parchara's conviction for aiding "a Qaeda operative in Pakistan
by agreeing to launder $200,000 through a Karachi bank").
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Program's ability to monitor "lower- and mid-level terrorist operatives and
54
financiers" as well as certain militant groups.
The Bush administration further contended that the program stood "'on
rock-solid legal ground.' ' 55 While some debate this claim, 56 many of the
program's critics do not dispute its legality. 57 The ombudsman for The New
York Times even wrote that his newspaper rushed to judgment on the
program's legality under U.S. laws. 5 8 Perhaps the best evidence of the
SWIFT Program's legality is SWIFT's decision not to challenge the
59
program's subpoenas in a U.S. court.
3. International Reaction to the SWIFT Program
Reaction to the SWIFT Program in Europe and other foreign nations,
60
many of which have stronger privacy protections than the United States,
was and still is decidedly negative. Most notably, the Belgian Privacy
Protection Commission concluded that SWIFT violated Belgian and E.U.
law when it cooperated with OFAC's administrative subpoenas: 6 1 "[It]
must be considered a serious error of judgment on the part of SWIFT to
subject a massive quantity of personal data to surveillance in a secret and
54. Meyer & Miller, supra note 9. According to Stuart Levey, Under Secretary of the
Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, the SWIFT Program is particularly useful
in monitoring "Hezbollah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad." Id. Other officials claim,
however, that it has "been only marginally successful against Al Qaeda." Id.
55. Barton Gellman, Paul Blustein & Dafna Linzer, Bank Records Secretly Tapped,
Wash. Post, June 23, 2006, at Al (quoting Under Secretary Levey).
56. See Business Briefing, Legal: SWIFT Ordered to Face Lawsuit, Wash. Post, June
16, 2007, at D2 (noting that a lawsuit filed against SWIFT for the alleged violation of
privacy rights had survived a motion to dismiss); Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 6
(interviewing a leading banking and privacy law expert who was troubled by the program's
broad subpoena powers).
57. See, e.g., Editorial, Bank Surveillance, Wash. Post, June 24, 2006, at A20 (noting
that the SWIFT Program "appears to be legal"); Byron Calame, Op-Ed., Can 'Magazines' of
The Times Subsidize News Coverage?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 2006, at A22 (faulting The New
York Times for rushing to judgment on the SWIFT Program's legality); see also Eric
Lichtblau, Controls on Bank-Data Spying Impress Civil Liberties Board, N.Y. Times, Nov.
29, 2006, at A26 (noting that a Democratic member of Congress's Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board was impressed "with the lengths to which [the SWIFT Program
has] gone to avoid infringing on people's civil rights").
58. See Calame, supra note 57.
59. See Soc'y for Worldwide Interbank Fin. Telecomm., Executive Summary of
SWIFT's Response to the Belgian Privacy Commission's Advisory Opinion 37/2006 of 27
September 2006, at 8 (2006) [hereinafter SWIFT's Response], available at
http://www.swift.com/index.cfm?itemid=60788 ("SWIFT determined [that a U.S. court]
was highly unlikely to conclude the subpoena was invalid under US law-based upon advice
received from specialized outside counsel."). A detailed analysis of the SWIFT Program's
legality under U.S. law is beyond the scope of this Note. For further discussion of this topic,
see Jeremy S. Shrader, Note & Comment, Secrets Hurt: How SWIFT Shook Up Congress,
the European Union, and the U.S. Banking Industry, 11 N.C. Banking Inst. 397, 409-11
(2007).
60. See Bilefsky, supra note 1 ("The European Union does not consider the United
States to be a country that offers sufficient legal protection of individual data.").
61. Belgian Opinion, supra note 8, at 26.
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systematic manner for years without effective grounds for justification and
without independent control in accordance with Belgian and European
62
law."
The Belgian Privacy Protection Commission found fault with SWIFT's
actions on a number of grounds. As a preliminary matter, the commission
categorized SWIFT as a "data controller" as opposed to a "data processor,"
a distinction that subjects SWIFT to greater liability for privacy violations
under Belgian law. 63 According to the commission, SWIFT ignored its
legal duty as a data controller to inform affected parties that it was
providing their financial data to the United States. 64 Further, the
commission faulted SWIFT for transferring personal data65to a country with
inadequate privacy protections, namely the United States.
Though the Belgian Privacy Protection Commission admitted that
SWIFT had a "legitimate interest" in complying with valid U.S. subpoenas,
it held nonetheless that this did not "justify a secret, systematic and large
scale violation of the basic European principles of data protection." 66 The
commission chastised SWIFT for simply complying with the subpoenas
rather than challenging them in a U.S. court. 67 Alternatively, the
commission suggested that SWIFT could have appealed to international
resolve conflict of laws problems
organizations that were developed to
68
related to tracking terrorist financing.
The Belgian Privacy Protection Commission did not recommend what
action should have been taken against SWIFT for its infractions, stating
instead merely that it would "remain[] available to issue further
guidance." 69 Other Belgian authorities similarly refrained from announcing
plans for legal action against SWIFT. 70 In fact, after the commission
announced its findings, Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt called the
SWIFT Program "an absolute necessity" and suggested that the United

62. Id.
63. Id. at 8. Under Belgian and E.U. law, a data controller "determines the purposes and
means of the processing of personal data," whereas a data processor "processes personal data
on behalf of the data controller." Id. at 9. "The distinction between both qualifications has
very important consequences ...[since] the processor has in principle a limited liability and
[concerned persons] can in principle only assert their rights on the data controller." Id.
SWIFT has called this aspect of the Commission's finding its "principal defect." SWIFT's
Response, supra note 59, at 1. For further information on this topic, compare Belgian

Opinion, supra note 8, at 8-15 (arguing that SWIFT is a data controller), with SWIFT's
Response, supra note 59, at 4-6 (arguing that SWIFT is a data processor).
64. See Belgian Opinion, supra note 8, at 17.
65. See id. at 18-19.
66. Id. at 20-21.
67. See id. at 21.
68. Id. In its response to the Belgian Privacy Protection Commission's findings, SWIFT
observed that such international organizations merely make recommendations to member
states and are not available as forums in which private entities can file grievances. See
SWIFT's Response, supra note 59, at 8.
69. Belgian Opinion, supra note 8, at 26.
70. See Anderson, supra note 51.
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States1 work with European nations to bring the program into line with E.U.
7
law.
Two months after the Belgian Privacy Protection Commission issued its
findings, an E.U. Article 29 Working Group--a panel composed of
representatives from each E.U. member country-reached largely the same
conclusions.7 2 Like the Belgian Privacy Protection Commission, the
working group considered SWIFT a "data controller. ' 73 It also concluded
that SWIFT had violated its "duty to provide information, the notification
of the processing [of personal data], [and] the obligation to provide an
appropriate level of protection to meet the requirements for international
transfers of personal data."'74 The working group continued,
[We are] of the opinion that the hidden, systematic, massive and longterm transfer of personal data by SWIFT to the [U.S. Treasury] in a
confidential, non-transparent and systematic manner for years without
effective legal grounds and without the possibility of independent control
by public data protection supervisory authorities constitutes a violation of
the fundamental European principles as regards75 data protection and is not
in accordance with Belgian and European law.
Unlike the Belgian Privacy Protection Commission, the Article 29
Working Group issued a list of "immediate actions" meant to address
SWIFT's infractions. 76 Among other mandates, the working group called
on SWIFT to cease its infringements of Belgian and E.U. law and to
"[r]eturn to lawful data processing." 77 According to E.U. officials, the
working group's findings caused the European Commission to consider
taking Belgium to court for failing to force SWIFT to uphold E.U. data
protection rules. 78 Some E.U. lawmakers even advised SWIFT to move its
North American operation center to Canada, where it would be more
79
insulated from U.S. subpoena power.

71. Id.
72. See Press Release, European Union Article 29 Working Party, supra note 8; see also
Dan Bilefsky, Panel Says Bank Group, Aiding U.S., Broke Law, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 2006,
at A22 ("A European Union panel concluded Wednesday that [SWIFT] breached European
Union data protection rules when it gave the Bush administration access to millions of
records of private financial transactions.").
73. Press Release, European Union Article 29 Working Party, supra note 8.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Bilefsky, supra note 72.
79. See Dan Bilefsky, Europeans Berate Bank Group and Overseerfor U.S. Access to
Data, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 2006, at A15. Even with the political compromise in place,
SWIFT is partially following this advice. See Melander, supra note 13 ("The financial
network announced earlier this month that it would modify its messaging system to ensure
that intra-European data are stored only in Europe and not in the United States.").
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4. Subsequent Action by SWIFT
On the day the U.S. media exposed the SWIFT Program, SWIFT issued a
press release to assure its clients that it had complied with the privacy laws
of all affected nations. 80 In the press release, SWIFT stressed that, although
it had voluntarily taken part in the negotiations that established the SWIFT

Program, the subpoenas were ultimately compulsory. 8 1 In the months after

the program's initial exposure, SWIFT sought to convince Belgian and
other E.U. officials that its compliance with the SWIFT Program was
permissible under their laws. 82 SWIFT also called on U.S. officials to

engage their E.U. counterparts in the hopes that they would reach a
83
mutually agreeable solution.

5. The U.S.-E.U. Compromise
The United States and the European Union heeded these calls and
reached an accord regarding the SWIFT Program on June 27, 2007. Under
the compromise, the United States agreed to (1) use data obtained through
the SWIFT Program exclusively for counterterrorism purposes; (2) delete

information unrelated to counterterrorism investigations on an ongoing
basis; (3) retain data for no more than five years; (4) permit an E.U. official
to monitor the program; and (5) publish the provisions of the agreement in
the Federal Register. 84 Though the compromise assuaged the fears of E.U.
86
officials, 85 certain details still must be approved by E.U. member states.

80. Swift.eom, supra note 10.
81. See id. For the purposes of liability, SWIFT has stressed that its cooperation with
the SWIFT Program is ultimately compelled by U.S. law and, thus, not actually voluntary.
82. See Swift.com, Commentary:
SWIFT Defends Compliance at EU Parliament
Hearing (Oct. 8, 2006), http://www.swift.com/index.cfm?itemid=60676 ("Speaking at a
three-hour hearing of the European Parliament in Brussels on Wednesday 4 October, SWIFT
CFO Francis Vanbever told Parliamentarians and journalists that SWIFT's compliance with
compulsory subpoenas from the US Treasury was legal and that SWIFT 'strongly objected'
to the opinion of the Belgian Data Privacy Commission that it had broken Belgian and EU
data protection laws."); Swift.com, SWIFT Supports Calls for Debate to Move Beyond Data
Privacy
to
Security
and
Public
Safety
(Nov.
16,
2006),
http://www.swift.com/index.cfin?itemid=60784 ("SWIFT has submitted a comprehensive
legal rebuttal to the Belgian Privacy Commission in response to its advisory opinion of 27
September 2006.").
83. Swift.com, US Bi-Partisan Panel "Impressed" by SWIFT's Controls to Protect Civil
Liberties (Nov. 29, 2006), http://www.swift.com/index.cfm?item-id=60966 ("SWIFT, which
is caught between serious interpretation issues surrounding current US and EU laws, has
called repeatedly for a global solution for providing financial intelligence for counterterrorism purposes with adequate data protection safeguards.").
84. Press Release, Europa, supra note 13.
85. See id. European Commission Vice President Franco Frattini stated, "The EU will
have now the necessary guarantees that [the] US Treasury processes data it receives from
Swift's mirror server in [the United States] in a way which takes account of EU data
protection principles." Id.
86. See Melander, supra note 13.
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The E.U.-U.S. Compromise provided a mutually agreeable solution to a
difficult legal and political conflict. However, some of the concessions that
the United States made to preserve the SWIFT Program will almost
certainly hamper U.S. counterterrorism efforts. For example, the U.S.-E.U.
Compromise's requirement that the U.S. Treasury delete information
unrelated to counterterrorism investigations may result in the irrevocable
deletion of the financial records of terrorists who have not yet been
identified as threats. While the compromise may have been necessary to
maintain important allies in the war on terror, it raises the question of
whether the United States had other options. Specifically, did the United
States have legal recourse to enforce its subpoenas against SWIFT in a U.S.
court even though doing so would force SWIFT to violate foreign law?
Part II's examination of the jurisprudence surrounding orders requiring
violation of foreign law reveals that there is no easy answer to this question.

II. U.S. COURTS' TREATMENT OF ORDERS
REQUIRING VIOLATION OF FOREIGN LAW
This part traces the evolution of U.S. courts' treatment of orders
requiring violation of foreign law and then addresses the current divide over
the appropriate roles of the balancing test and good faith analysis. Part II.A
examines attempts by U.S. courts to reconcile the Supreme Court's only
relevant holding regarding such orders with the subsequent issuance of two
restatements, both of which endorsed the use of a balancing test. Part II.B
focuses on the good faith standard and the varying significance that courts
attach to good and bad faith acts in response to orders requiring violation of
foreign law. This section identifies three distinct approaches to the
significance of good and bad faith acts. Finally, Part II.C discusses various
attempts to circumvent the problem of orders requiring violation of foreign
law through formal and informal international cooperation.
A. Evolution of U.S. Courts' Treatment of
Orders Requiring Violation of ForeignLaw
1. The Supreme Court Lays the Foundation: Societe Internationale
The Supreme Court last confronted the enforceability of orders requiring
violation of foreign law in the landmark 1958 case Societe Internationale
pour ParticipationsIndustrielles et Commerciales v. Rogers.87 In Societe
Internationale, Societe, a Swiss holding company, sued to recover assets
seized by the U.S. government in World War II pursuant to the Trading
with the Enemy Act. 88 In preparing its defense, the U.S. government
moved for an order requiring Societe to produce banking records relevant to

87. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
88. See id. at 198-99.
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the ownership of the assets in question. 89 Though it partially complied with
the order, Societe asked for relief from full compliance on the grounds that
producing certain bank records would violate Swiss law. 90 In response, the
U.S. government filed a motion to dismiss. 9 1 The trial court granted the
motion, holding, "Swiss law did not furnish an adequate excuse for
[Societe's] failure to comply with the production order, since [Societe]
could not invoke foreign laws to justify disobedience to orders entered
under the laws of the forum." 92 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
93
Circuit affirmed on appeal.
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the threat of violating a foreign
law could justify noncompliance with an otherwise valid production
order. 94 The Court first addressed the propriety of the production order's
issuance, 95 questioning whether Societe could be said to "control" the
restricted materials for the purpose of production when Swiss law
prohibited their disclosure. 96 After considering the policies underlying the
Trading with the Enemy Act, 9 7 the importance of the materials to the
litigation, 9 8 and Societe's nationality,9 9 the Court found that Societe had
control over the materials and that the issuance of the production order was

89. See id. at 199-200.
90. See id. at 200.
91. See id.
92. Id.at 201-02.
93. See id.at 202. Initially, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit altered the
dismissal order to allow Societe an additional six months to ask the Swiss government for
permission to produce the restricted materials. See id.at 202-03. The district court directed
final dismissal after these efforts failed to comply sufficiently with the production order. See
id. at 203. The court rejected Societe's suggestion that an independent investigator be given
access to the restricted materials in order to identify relevant documents without
compromising their confidentiality. See id. Interestingly, this plan bears some resemblance
to the structure of the SWIFT Program in that both utilize an independent
investigator/auditor as a means of straddling the line between disclosure and secrecy. See
supra note 45 and accompanying text.
94. Societe Internationale, 357 U.S. at 213.
95. See id.at 204.
96. Id. ("The question then becomes: Do the interdictions of Swiss law bar a conclusion
that petitioner had 'control' of these documents within the meaning of Rule 34 [of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure]?"). The Swiss Federal Attorney had actually confiscated
the restricted materials in this case to preserve their secrecy. See id. at 200. The Court held
that this fact "add[ed] nothing to the dimensions of the problem," instead finding that the
true bar to control was "the possibility of criminal prosecution" in Switzerland. Id.at 204.
97. See id.at 204-05 ("[The] possibility of enemy taint of nationals of neutral powers,
particularly of holding companies with intricate financial structures, which asserted rights to
American assets was of deep concern to the Congress.").
98. See id. at 205 ("The District Court here concluded that the [restricted materials]
might have a vital influence upon this litigation insofar as they shed light upon [Societe's]
confused background.").
99. See id.("[Societe] is in a most advantageous position to plead with its own sovereign
for relaxation of penal laws or for adoption of plans which will at the least achieve a
significant measure of compliance with the production order.").
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proper.' 0 0 The Court noted, however, that its holding was limited to the
circumstances of the case at hand. 10
The Court next addressed whether Societe's failure to comply with the
order was excusable. 102 In conducting this analysis, the Court placed
considerable emphasis on the district court's finding that Societe had not
"conspired" to take advantage of Swiss secrecy laws and had made "good
faith" efforts to comply with the production order. 10 3 The Court found that
"[Societe's] failure to satisfy fully the requirements of this production order
was due to inability fostered neither by its own conduct nor by
circumstances within its control."' 1 4 Unlike the lower courts, the Supreme
Court found that these circumstances could potentially excuse
noncompliance: "It is hardly debatable that fear of criminal prosecution
constitutes a weighty excuse for nonproduction, and this excuse is not
weakened because the laws preventing compliance are those of a foreign
sovereign."' 1 5 The Court found that Societe was effectively asserting a
defense of "inability to comply because of foreign law."'1 6 The Court
concluded that the sanction of dismissal was improper where the "failure to
comply [with a production order was] due10 7to inability, and not to
willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of [Societe].'
2. Deferring to International Comity: Societe InternationaleDisregarded
Ironically, the first line of cases to emerge post-Societe Internationale
completely disregarded the Supreme Court's ruling. 10 8 In a series of cases,
100. See id. ("United States courts should be free to require claimants of seized assets
who face legal obstacles under the laws of their own countries to make all such efforts to the
maximum of their ability where the requested records promise to bear out or dispel any
doubt the Government may introduce as to true ownership of the assets.").
101. See id. at 205-06. The Court underscored the limited nature of its holding:
We do not say that this ruling would apply to every situation where a party is
restricted by law from producing documents over which it is otherwise shown to
have control. .

.

. The propriety [of production orders] depends upon the

circumstances of a given case, and we hold only that accommodation... in this
instance to the policies underlying the Trading with the Enemy Act justified the
action of the District Court in issuing this production order.
Id.
102. See id. at 208. As an intermediary step, the Court established that the district court
did have the authority to dismiss the complaint. See id. at 206-08.
103. Id. at 208-09 (finding that bad faith on the part of Societe "would have a vital
bearing on justification for dismissal of the action, but ... [that the] findings below reach no
such conclusions"). For a further discussion of good and bad faith, see infra Part lI.B.
104. Id. at211.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 212.
107. Id.
108. See In re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611, 613 (2d Cir. 1962); Ings v.
Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 1960); First Nat'l City Bank of New York v. IRS, 271
F.2d 616, 619-20 (2d Cir. 1959). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit may
have failed to cite Societe Internationale since these cases concerned grand jury subpoenas
duces tecum and administrative subpoenas as opposed to civil discovery orders. Courts
would later apply the principles of Societe Internationaleto such subpoenas, however. See,
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the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that courts should
never order the production of materials that require violation of foreign
law. 10 9 In FirstNational City Bank of New York v. I.R.S., the first of these
cases, the Second Circuit confronted an Internal Revenue Service
summons-a type of administrative subpoena-requiring a New York bank
to produce records located in Panama allegedly in violation of Panamanian
law. 1 0 The Second Circuit found that there was insufficient evidence to
conclude that production would actually violate Panamanian law,"'1 but
noted that, in cases where foreign illegality could be proven, "the
12
production of the... records should not be ordered.""
The Second Circuit cited this dictum in two subsequent cases, effectively
establishing a ban against orders requiring violation of foreign law. In Ings
v. Ferguson, the court modified a subpoena duces tecum that would have
required a bank to produce financial records allegedly in violation of
Canadian law. 113 Rather than enforce the subpoena, the court advised the
party seeking production to ask for assistance from Canada's courts via a
letter rogatory. 114 (A letter rogatory is essentially a request that a foreign
court take evidence on behalf of a U.S. court.) 1 5 Two years later, in the
case of In re Chase Manhattan Bank, the Second Circuit again modified a
subpoena duces tecum that would have required a New York bank to
violate Panamanian law. 116 As in Ings, the court stated it would not order a
production in violation of foreign law and advised the party seeking
production-the U.S. government-to request assistance from Panamanian
7
authorities in obtaining the documents." 1

e.g., United States v. Bank of N.S., 691 F.2d 1384, 1388-89 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (applying the
logic of Societe Internationaleto a grand jury subpoena duces tecum).
109. See In re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d at 613; Ings, 282 F.2d at 152 ("Upon
fundamental principles of international comity, our courts dedicated to the enforcement of
our laws should not take such action as may cause a violation of the laws of a friendly
neighbor or, at the least, an unnecessary circumvention of its procedures."); First Nat 'lCity
Bank of New York, 271 F.2d at 619 (holding that the production of records should not be
ordered where production would require violation of foreign law).
110. FirstNat 'l
City Bank of New York, 271 F.2d at 618.
111. See id. at 619 ("[T]he only evidence [that production would violate Panamanian law]
was contained in the affidavit of the Bank's expert . . . which in our view constituted
insufficient basis for nonenforcement of the subpoena.").
112. Id.
113. Ings, 282 F.2d at 150-53.
114. See id. at 152-53. The court reasoned that a Canadian court would either enforce the
production order or rule that production would be illegal, in which case the Second Circuit
would quash the order. See id. at 152-53.
115. See ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Obtaining Discovery Abroad 9 (2005) ("[Letters
rogatory] are formal communications sent by a court in which an action is pending to a court
of a foreign country, requesting the foreign court to take the testimony of a witness resident
within that court's jurisdiction and transmit a transcript to the issuing court.").
116. In re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962).
117. Specifically, the court noted that the subpoena duces tecum was left outstanding to
"insure [the bank's] cooperation with the [U.S. government] when and if the [U.S.
government] seeks to obtain the records by application to the Panamanian authorities." Id. at
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The guiding principle in these decisions was deference to international
comity. According to the Second Circuit, "[U.S. courts] have an obligation
to respect the laws of other sovereign states even though they may differ in
economic and legal philosophy from our own."1 18 The Second Circuit was
not concerned that this strong deference to international comity invalidated
all orders requiring violation of foreign law since alternative evidencegathering techniques existed.1 19
Subsequent holdings in the Second Circuit and elsewhere have limited
the significance of these cases. 120 But, even as courts have moved toward a
more flexible approach, some commentators believe that deference to
12 1
international comity remains an influential principle.
3. The Restatement (Second): Introducing the Balancing Test
The next major shift in courts' thinking came in 1965, with the American
Law Institute's (ALI) publication of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States. The Restatement (Second) instructed
courts to balance several important factors when assessing the validity of an
order requiring violation of foreign law, specifically
(a) [the] vital national interests of each of the states,

613. The court appeared to advise the U.S. government to file a letter rogatory with the
appropriate Panamanian authorities.
118. Id. at 613; see also White v. Kenneth Warren & Son, Ltd., 203 F.R.D. 369, 372
(N.D. I1. 2001) ("Comity, in the international sense, is defined as courtesy demonstrated
between nations involving the mutual recognition of legislative, executive, and judicial
acts.").
119. See In re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d at 613 (discussing the possibility that a
party might "ask[] the [foreign] authorities to authorize... [production of] the documents");
Ings, 282 F.2d at 151 ("For many years the time honored custom of seeking evidence in
foreign countries, particularly in cases in which the aid of foreign courts may be necessary to
secure the production of records, has been by letters rogatory."). But see U.S. Department of
State,
Preparation
of
Letters
Rogatory,
http://travel.state.gov/law/info/judicial/judicial_683.html
(last visited July 28, 2007)
("Letters rogatory are a time consuming, cumbersome process and should not be utilized
unless there are no other options available.").
120. See SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(noting that the Second Circuit has disavowed these cases and "has clearly moved to a more
flexible position"); infra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d 494, 498 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("We do not here
decide the general issue of whether a court may ever order action in violation of foreign
laws, although we should say that it causes us considerable discomfort to think that a court
of law should order a violation of law, particularly on the territory of the sovereign whose
law is in question."); Feagle, supra note 16, at 302-03 ("[International] comity-driven
decisions have never been explicitly overruled and comity jurisprudence continues to be
influential, appearing not only in dicta, but also in applications of the current balancing
analysis."). But see Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law § 39(1) (1965) ("A
state having jurisdiction to prescribe or to enforce a rule of law is not precluded from
exercising its jurisdiction solely because such exercise requires a person to engage in
conduct subjecting him to liability under the law of another state having jurisdiction with
respect to that conduct."); Brodeur, supra note 16, at 585-86 (claiming that deference to
international comity has "ceased to be influential").
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(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent
enforcement actions would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the
territory of the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can
reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by
122
that state.
Commentators disagree as to whether the Restatement (Second) codified
the Supreme Court's holding in Societe Internationale or moved in an
23
entirely different direction altogether. 1
Regardless, courts quickly embraced the Restatement (Second)'s
balancing test, 124 beginning with the Second Circuit in the watershed case
of United States v. FirstNational City Bank. 125 There, the court addressed
a grand jury subpoena issued against Citibank pursuant to a government
antitrust investigation of some of the bank's customers. 126 Citibank refused
to comply with the subpoena on the grounds that production of the
requested materials-documents located in Citibank's New York City and
Frankfurt, Germany, branches-would violate its contractual obligations to
these customers under German law, opening the bank to civil liability
claims. 127
In assessing whether these circumstances excused Citibank's
noncompliance, the court adopted the Restatement (Second)'s balancing
test, overturning its prior holdings that such production orders were per se
invalid.128 The court held, "Mechanical or overbroad rules of thumb are of
little value; what is required is a careful balancing of the interests involved
and a precise understanding of the facts and circumstances of the particular
29
case."1

122. Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law § 40 (1965).
123. Compare Feagle, supra note 16, at 303-05 (arguing that Societe Internationale's

"balancing test" has been "expanded and codified in two versions of the Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States"), with Brodeur, supra note 16, at 588 (arguing
that a "close reading [of] Societe Internationale reveals no 'balancing"' unlike the
Restatement (Second)).
124. See, e.g., United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404, 407 (5th Cir. 1976) (citing the
Restatement (Second)'s balancing test); Trade Dev. Bank v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 35, 41
(2d Cir. 1972) (same); United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 902 (2d Cir.

1968) (same).
125. 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968).

126. See id. at 898.
127. See id. at 898-99.
128. See id. at 902 ("In evaluating Citibank's contention that compliance should be

excused because of the alleged conflict between the order of the court below and German
law, we are aided materially by the rationale of the recent Restatement [(Second)].").
129. Id. at 901.
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The Second Circuit focused on two of the Restatement (Second)'s
factors, namely the conflicting national interests at stake and the hardship
facing Citibank. 130 In balancing national interests, the court gave great
weight to the United States' interest in enforcing subpoenas generally and
in antitrust actions in particular. 13 1 Turning to Germany's interest in bank
secrecy, the court admitted that assessing the importance of a foreign
national interest was inherently difficult. 132 Nonetheless, the court
questioned the importance of bank secrecy to Germany given that it can be
waived 133 and is not codified.' 34 The court also noted that the German
government did not expressly object to the subpoena in this case as
endangering German interests. 135 The court then considered the hardship
facing the bank-potential foreign civil liability-and found it too "slight
36
and speculative" to excuse noncompliance with the subpoena.1
the district court's contempt order
Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirmed
37
against Citibank for noncompliance.1
The Restatement (Second)'s balancing test has proven highly influential
following its use in FirstNational City Bank, but courts disagree over many
of its features. For example, courts disagree over whether to apply the test
in two phases-first to the propriety of the order and then to the propriety
of enforcing the order with sanctions-or simply to conduct a unitary
analysis. 13 8 In First National City Bank, the Second Circuit drew no
130. See id. at 902 (limiting its inquiry to the "national interests of the United States and
Germany" and "the hardship, if any, Citibank will suffer").
131. See id. at 902-03. The court quoted Judge Learned Hand in support of the
importance of subpoenas as an evidence-gathering tool: "The suppression of truth is a
grievous necessity at best, more especially where as here the inquiry concerns the public
interest; it can be justified at all only where the opposing private interest is supreme." Id.
The court did not appear troubled that avoiding "suppression of truth" could be offered as a
vital national interest to justify any subpoena (or any civil discovery order) requiring
violation of foreign law. Id. at 903 ("We would have great reluctance... to countenance any
device that would place relevant information beyond the reach of this duly impaneled Grand
Jury or impede or delay its proceedings.").
132. See id. ("We examine the importance of bank secrecy within the framework of
German public policy with full recognition that it is often a subtle and difficult undertaking
to determine the nature and scope of the law of a foreign jurisdiction."). Critics of the
balancing test argue that U.S. courts are no better positioned to assess the importance of U.S.
national interests than they are of foreign ones. See infra notes 158-61 and accompanying
text.
133. See First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d at 903 ("[I]t is surely of considerable
significance that Germany considers bank secrecy simply a privilege that can be waived by
the customer and is content to leave the matter of enforcement to the vagaries of private
litigation.").
134. See id. ("Indeed, bank secrecy is not even required by statute.").
135. See id. at 904 ("[I]t is noteworthy that . . . the German Government has [not]
expressed any view on this case or indicated that, under the circumstances present here,
enforcement of the subpoena would violate German public policy or embarrass GermanAmerican relations.").
136. Id. at 905.
137. See id.
138. Compare id. (assessing the propriety of the subpoena and enforcement together), and
SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 117 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (same), with
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distinction between the propriety of the subpoena and the propriety of
enforcing it with a civil contempt citation. 139 Other circuits criticize this
approach, preferring a bifurcated analysis. 140 These courts construe Societe
Internationale as advocating separate analysis of the order and its
enforcement. 141 Courts employing the bifurcated approach first examine
the validity of the production order, and then, if the order is valid and the
party fails to comply, whether sanctions are appropriate. Though this is a
seemingly insignificant distinction, 42 there are some cases in which it
would alter the analysis. 14 3 In fact, some commentators suggest that this
distinction must be made to conduct the good faith analysis mandated by
44
Societe Internationale.1
Different courts also emphasize different factors of the Restatement
(Second)'s balancing test. For example, in First National City Bank, the
Second Circuit only considered two of the Restatement (Second)'s five
In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977)
(separately assessing the propriety of the production order and sanctions), and Arthur
Andersen & Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1976) (same).
139. First Nat ' City Bank, 396 F.2d at 897; see also Banca Della Svizzera Italiana,92
F.R.D. at 117 n.3 ("One way in which the Second Circuit has not moved in line with other
courts has been its failure thus far to distinguish the analysis used for deciding to issue an
order compelling discovery and that for imposing sanctions."); Brodeur, supra note 16, at
589 (noting that the Second Circuit "merged the propriety of the production order and the
propriety of contempt sanctions into a single issue in FirstNational City Bank").
140. See, e.g., Arthur Andersen, 546 F.2d at 341 ("The failure of [the Second Circuit] to
recognize the distinction between power to compel discovery and imposition of sanctions for
noncompliance has been criticized.").
141. In re Westinghouse, 563 F.2d at 997 ("In our view [Societe Internationale] holds
that, though a local court has the power to order a party to produce foreign documents
despite the fact that such production may subject the party to criminal sanctions in the
foreign country, still the fact of foreign illegality may prevent the imposition of sanctions for
subsequent disobedience to the discovery order."); Arthur Andersen, 546 F.2d at 342
("[Societe Internationale]does not say that a discovery order mandating violation of foreign
law is invalid. It only indicates that the foreign law question goes to the imposition of a
sanction for noncompliance with local law.").
142. See Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. at 117 n.3 ("Such a distinction in
analysis makes little, if any, practical difference.").
143. Consider the following example: A bank is ordered to disclose records in violation
of foreign law. The circumstances of the order are such that any court using the Restatement
(Second)'s balancing test would excuse the bank's noncompliance. The merged analysis
approach taken by the Second Circuit would thus excuse noncompliance. Under the
bifurcated approach advocated by the Tenth Circuit, however, the court would find the
issuance of the subpoena proper and expect the bank to make a good faith effort to comply
as mandated by Societe Internationale (e.g., asking the foreign government to permit
disclosure of records deemed essential by an independent investigator). If the bank's good
faith efforts still fail to comply fully with the order, the court would find that the balancing
test weighs in the bank's favor and that sanctions are therefore inappropriate. This
bifurcated approach requires the bank to attempt to comply and, as such, has a better chance
of compelling partial or full compliance than the unitary approach.
144. See Brodeur, supra note 16, at 589 ("Importantly, [the Second Circuit's merged or
unitary approach in FirstNational City Bank,] precluded an examination of the bank's good
faith."). Brodeur notes that FirstNational City Bank may ignore good faith analysis since
the Restatement (Second) does the same. Id. at 589 n.143. For further discussion of good
faith, see infra Part II.B.
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factors: "[We must] balance the national interests of the United States and
Germany and.., give appropriate weight to the hardship, if any, Citibank
will suffer." 145 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, on the other
hand, held that the first 146
factor alone-the vital national interests-is the
"most important factor."'
Some courts even introduce additional factors
14 7
into the balancing test, such as the importance of the evidence sought.
The most troublesome of the Restatement (Second)'s balancing factorsthe conflicting vital national interests at stake-presents courts with an
array of problems. As a preliminary matter, courts must identify what
148
qualifies as vital national interests. As seen in FirstNational City Bank,
the archetypal conflict of interest in these cases is between the United
149
States' far-reaching evidence-gathering tools and foreign secrecy laws.
Though courts balance these principles abstractly, they also consider the
specific nature of the underlying action. For example, courts employing the
Restatement (Second) have held that broad evidence gathering is necessary
152 and narcotics laws,' 53
to properly enforce antitrust,1 50 tax, 15 1 securities,
145. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d at 902 (omitting or glossing over any discussion of
the Restatement (Second)'s other factors); accord Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs.,
Inc., 116 F.R.D. 517, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("Courts in [the Second Circuit] have
characterized the first two factors-the competing interests of the countries involved and the
hardship imposed by compliance-as far more important in the balancing test than the last
three.").
146. United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404, 407 (5th Cir. 1976) (omitting analysis of any
factor save the interests of the states involved).
147. See Trade Dev. Bank v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 35, 41 (2d Cir. 1972) ("In addition
to the factors that ordinarily must be considered by the court in deciding whether to order a
disclosure prohibited by the law of another state . . . the relative unimportance of the
information . . . was entitled to be considered."); see also Minpeco, 116 F.R.D. at 522
(noting that courts should also consider "the importance of the information and documents
requested").
148. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341, 346 (7th Cir.
1983) (weighing U.S. interest in evidence gathering against a foreign nation's interest in
bank secrecy); United States v. Bank of N.S., 691 F.2d 1384, 1391 (11 th Cir. 1982) (same);
Field, 532 F.2d at 407 (same); see also In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts
Litig., 563 F.2d 992, 998-99 (10th Cir. 1977) (weighing U.S. interest in affording litigants
adequate discovery against a foreign nation's interest in regulating access to sensitive
documents); Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, 231 F.R.D. 538, 549 (N.D. I11.2004) (same).
150. See First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d at 903 ("[Antitrust laws] have long been
considered cornerstones of this nation's economic policies."); Remington Prods., Inc. v. N.
Am. Philips Corp., 107 F.R.D. 642, 651 (D. Conn. 1985) ("The vital national interest of the
United States in the enforcement of its antitrust laws is unquestionable.").
151. See First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d at 346 (discussing the importance of tax
investigations); United States v. Vetco, Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1289 (9th Cir. 1981) ("There is
a strong American interest in collecting taxes from and prosecuting tax fraud by its own
nationals operating through foreign subsidiaries."); Field, 532 F.2d at 407 ("In this case, the
United States seeks to obtain information concerning the violation of its tax laws.").
152. See SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
("The strength of the United States interest in enforcing its securities laws to ensure the
integrity of its financial markets cannot seriously be doubted.").
153. See United States v. Bank of N.S., 740 F.2d 817, 827 (11 th Cir. 1984) ("Stemming
the narcotics trade has long been a concern of paramount importance to our nation.").
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all of which protect vital national interests in their own right. Courts also
examine the underlying purpose of foreign secrecy laws, according them
U.S. evidence
little or no weight if their purpose is simply to frustrate
155
gathering.154 Such laws are termed "blocking statutes."
Courts also disagree over how to balance the conflicting national
interests in a given case. Specifically, courts disagree over the significance
of statements of interest-or the lack of such statements-by the United
States and foreign nations. In First National City Bank, the Second Circuit
attached great significance to the German government's failure to object to
the subpoena at issue: "We are fully aware that when foreign governments,
including Germany, have considered their vital national interests threatened,
they have not hesitated to make known their objections to the enforcement
of a subpoena to the issuing court." 156 On the other hand, the U.S. Court of
are significant only
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that such statements
157
if they are made "prior to the litigation in question."'
Some courts have even suggested that balancing competing national
interests is all but impossible. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit summed up the sentiment of these courts when it called this aspect
158
of the Restatement (Second)'s balancing test a "ridiculous assignment."'
Courts complain that they lack the expertise to properly balance national
interests, 159 and that they are uncomfortable making judgments traditionally
154. See Remington, 107 F.R.D. at 651 ("Frustration of the law enforcement efforts of
another country is not a legitimate national interest which can justify the failure to enforce a
valid Court order.").
155. Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 116 F.R.D. 517, 524 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (distinguishing "blocking statutes" from those protecting a legitimate national
interest).
156. United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 904 (2d Cir. 1968) (finding it
"noteworthy" that "neither the [U.S.] Department of State nor the German Government has
expressed any view on this case or indicated that, under the circumstances present here,
enforcement of the subpoena would violate German public policy or embarrass GermanAmerican relations"); accord United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1035 (2d Cir. 1985)
("The absence of any objection by the Cayman government to the subpoena and subsequent
order... is significant."); Minpeco, 116 F.R.D. at 525 (attaching significance to two official
statements related to the importance of Swiss bank secrecy laws). Some courts have also
looked to foreign courts to assess the importance of a given national interest. See In re
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992, 998 (10th Cir. 1977)
("That Canada has a legitimate 'national interest' in this matter is perhaps best illustrated by
reading the opinion of the Ontario Supreme Court ....); see also Arthur Andersen & Co. v.
Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338, 342 (10th Cir. 1976) ("If the problem involves a breach of friendly
relations between two nations, Andersen should call the matter to the attention of those
officers and agencies of the United States charged with the conduct of foreign affairs, and
they could make such representation to the court as they deemed suitable.").
157. Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1476 (9th Cir. 1992)
(according little weight to China's expression of interest since it was made after litigation
commenced).
158. Reinsurance Co. of Am. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 902 F.2d 1275, 1280
concurring) ("If I thought we had to do
(7th Cir. 1990); accord id. at 1284 (Easterbrook, J.,
such balancing, I would be at sea.").
159. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D. I11.
1979) ("Aside from the fact that the judiciary has little expertise, or perhaps even authority,
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left to the political branches of government. 160 Though these courts
generally try to balance the competing national interests nonetheless, at
least one district court has refused to attempt the analysis, calling it
16 1
"inherently unworkable."'
Finally, some courts employing the Restatement (Second)'s test are more
deferential to government subpoenas than to civil discovery orders, while
other courts do not draw this distinction. In United States v. Davis, the
Second Circuit held that subpoenas issued pursuant to government
investigations deserve "some deference."' 62 Yet courts in other circuits
63
have failed to note this distinction even when particularly applicable. 1
Partially as a result of these various disagreements, the Restatement
(Second)'s approach has yielded some unsatisfactory results. One of the
most cited examples is In re Westinghouse Electric Corp. Uranium
ContractsLitigation,16 4 in which the majority and the dissent both relied on
the Restatement (Second)'s balancing test, but reached opposite
conclusions. 165 Critics view In re Westinghouse as emblematic of courts'
inability to employ the balancing test in a consistent manner. 166 Foreign
to evaluate the economic and social policies of a foreign country, such a balancing test is
inherently unworkable in this case.").
160. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d at 901 ("[T]he difficulties are manifold because the
courts must take care not to impinge upon the prerogatives and responsibilities of the
political branches of the government in the extremely sensitive and delicate area of foreign
affairs."); see also Soci~t6 Nationale Industrielle A~rospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S.
522, 552 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("It is the Executive
that normally decides when a course of action is important enough to risk affronting a
foreign nation or placing a strain on foreign commerce. It is the Executive, as well, that is
best equipped to determine how to accommodate foreign interest along with our own.").
161. Rio Algom, 480 F. Supp at 1148. But see Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, 231 F.R.D.
538, 548-49 (N.D. Ill.
2004) (criticizing Rio Algom's refusal to conduct the balancing
analysis, noting that "limited ability does not relieve us of the obligation to assess those
interests as best we can, based on the record that we have").
162. United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1035 (2d Cir. 1985) ("We must.., accord
some deference to the determination by the Executive Branch-the arm of the government
charged with primary responsibility for formulating and effectuating foreign policy-that the
adverse diplomatic consequences of the discovery request would be outweighed by the
benefits of disclosure."); accord United States v. Vetco, Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1288 (9th Cir.
1981) ("[S]ummonses appear to serve a more pressing national function than civil
discovery.").
163. See Reinsurance Co. of Am. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 902 F.2d 1275,
1284 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring). Judge Frank Easterbrook stated, "I would
be hard pressed to agree ... that a suit by the government is 'more important' than private
litigation. In a capitalist economy enforcement of contracts is a subject of the first
magnitude." Id.
164. 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977).
165. Compare id. at 999 (granting defendant relief after finding that the Restatement
(Second)'s balancing test weighed in his favor), with id. at 1003 (Doyle, J., dissenting) ("If a
balancing test is to be used and relief is to be granted, the case would have to show more
merit than we see here."). That said, balancing tests are used in all areas of the law even
though judges sometimes reach conflicting conclusions from the same set of facts.
166. See Browne, supra note 16, at 1335 (highlighting In re Westinghouse as "aptly
illustrat[ing] the problem" of using the Restatement (Second)'s balancing test); Levarda,
supra note 16, at 1368-69 (same).
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commentators have been equally harsh in their assessment of the
Restatement (Second), claiming that it fails to adequately value the foreign
67
interests at stake.1
4. The Restatement (Third): The Balancing Test Refined
The ALI's 1987 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States attempts to address some of the issues raised by the
Restatement (Second).
First, the Restatement (Third) endorses the
bifurcated or two-phased approach used by the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit in In re Westinghouse and Arthur Andersen. "In the first
phase, the requesting party seeks an order to compel compliance with the
request, and the responding party seeks to have it set aside."' 168 The
Restatement (Third) instructs courts to use a modified version of the
balancing test during this first phase to determine the validity of the
order. 169 "If the first phase is decided in favor of production and the
responding party fails to comply, there may be a second phase to determine
the consequences of noncompliance."' 170 Though courts "should not
ordinarily impose sanctions," the Restatement (Third) advises that sanctions
are appropriate "in cases of deliberate concealment or removal of
information or of failure to make a good faith effort [to secure permission
17 1
from the foreign authorities to make the information available]."'
Second, the Restatement (Third) advocates a modified balancing test for
assessing the validity of the order in the first phase of analysis:
[A] court or agency.., should take into account the importance to the
investigation or litigation of the documents or other information
requested; the degree of specificity of the request; whether the
information originated in the United States; the availability of alternative
means of securing the information; and the extent to which
noncompliance with the request would undermine important interests of
the United States, or compliance with the request would undermine
important interests of the state where the information is located. 172

167. Lawrence Collins, Essays in International Litigation and the Conflict of Laws 337
(1994). Collins writes,
It is sufficient to say that whilst by the mid-1960s the case-law was perceived as
indicating a way in which conflicts between US law and foreign law could be
resolved, it no longer provides such a resolution. The positions have become
entrenched. The balancing required by the cases.., has come down heavily in
favour of US law.
Id. (citations omitted); see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 218 F. Supp. 2d 544, 554
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("Courts consistently hold that the United States interest in law
enforcement outweighs the interests of the foreign states in bank secrecy and the hardships
imposed on the entity subject to compliance.").
168. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 442 cmt. g (1987).
169. See id. § 442(l)(c).
170. Id. § 442 cmt. g.

171. Id. § 442(2)(b).
172. Id. § 442(1)(c).
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Notably absent from this new list of factors is the extent and nature of the
hardship3 that the foreign state would impose on the party for violation of its
laws.

17

Finally, the Restatement (Third) prescribes a relatively specific method
for balancing the vital national interests at stake:
In making this determination, the court or agency will look, inter alia, to
expressions of interest by the foreign state, as contrasted with expressions
by the parties; to the significance of disclosure in the regulation by the
foreign state of the activity in question; and to indications of the foreign
to the controversy in connection
state's concern for confidentiality prior
74
with which the information is sought. 1
The Restatement (Third) created disagreement of its own, however,
especially as to whether it replaces or just supplements the Restatement
(Second). A number of courts now use a balancing test combining all of the
factors from both Restatements. 175 Others use only the Restatement
177
(Third). 176 Still others continue to use only the Restatement (Second).
Though the Restatement (Second), unlike the Restatement (Third), does not
discuss the significance of good faith efforts,' 78 courts employing only the
still conduct good faith analysis as mandated by
Restatement (Second) 79
Societe Internationale.1

173. This is notable in that some courts considered the nature and extent of the hardship
to be the most important factors of the Restatement (Second)'s balancing test. See supra note
145 and accompanying text.
174. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 442 cmt. c (1987).
175. See, e.g., Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1474-75
(9th Cir. 1992) (citing both the Restatement (Second)'s and Restatement (Third)'s balancing
tests); Reinsurance Co. of Am. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 902 F.2d 1275, 127983 (7th Cir. 1990) (same); Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, 231 F.R.D. 538, 542-43 (N.D. I11.
2004) (same).
176. See, e.g., White v. Kenneth Warren & Son, Ltd., 203 F.R.D. 369, 374-75 (N.D. Ill.
2001) (balancing only the Restatement (Third)'s factors); Madanes v. Madanes, 186 F.R.D.
279, 285-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (same); McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 138
F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1991) (same). In Madanes the district court claimed that the Supreme
Court specifically endorsed the Restatement (Third)'s test. Madanes, 186 F.R.D. at 286; see
also Richmark, 959 F.2d at 1474-75. It is true that, in Adrospatiale, the Supreme Court
called the Restatement (Third)'s factors "relevant to any comity analysis." Soci~t6 Nationale
Industrielle A~rospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 544 n.28 (1987). However, the
Court did not hold that the Restatement (Second)'s factors should be disregarded.
177. See, e.g., Cochran Consulting, Inc. v. Uwatec USA, Inc., 102 F.3d 1224, 1227 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) (citing only the Restatement (Second)); RNW Assocs., Inc. v. Corporate
Underwriters, Ltd., No. 93-6327, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 36229, at *7-8 (10th Cir. Dec. 23,
1994) (same); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 218 F. Supp. 2d 544, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(same).
178. See Reinsurance Co. of Am., 902 F.2d at 1282 ("[The Restatement (Third)] does
make one significant change to the old standard by introducing an element of good faith to
be included at the court's discretion.").
179. See RNW Assocs., Inc., 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 36229, at *7-8 (discussing good
faith in the context of the Restatement (Second)).
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B. Good Faith Analysis
In Societe Internationale, the Supreme Court ultimately found that
noncompliance with an order requiring violation of foreign law did not
justify dismissal of Societe's claim, in light of Societe's good faith efforts
to comply with the order. 180 Since then, lower courts have recognized the
importance of conducting good faith analysis in cases involving orders
requiring violation of foreign law.181 However, courts are unable to agree
on a good faith standard or how much weight to attach to evidence of good
or bad faith.
1. The Good Faith Standard
In Societe Internationale, the Supreme Court's good faith analysis
involved two steps: (1) finding a lack of bad faith "collusion" with the
foreign government in question and (2) assessing Societe's affirmative good
82
faith efforts to comply with the production order. 1
a. Lack of Bad Faith
The Supreme Court initiated its good faith analysis in Societe
Internationale by asking whether sanctions were appropriate "despite the
findings that [Societe] had not been in collusion with the Swiss authorities
to block inspection of the [requested documents]. . . ,"183 The Court
suggested that, had Societe colluded with the Swiss government, it would
weigh heavily in favor of enforcing the production order through
sanctions. 184 Lower courts have followed the Supreme Court's lead in
holding that a party that seeks out foreign legal impediments or colludes
with foreign governments generally will not be considered to have acted in
good faith.1 85 Such collusion is relevant even if it occurred long before the
1 86
litigation at issue.
180. See supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., United States v. Bank of N.S., 740 F.2d 817, 825 (11th Cir. 1984)
(discussing good faith); United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341, 346 (7th
Cir. 1983) (same); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992,
998 (10th Cir. 1977) (same); Trade Dev. Bank v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir.
1972) (same); SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)

(same).
182. Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales v. Rogers,
357 U.S. 197, 208 (1958).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 209 ("[Courting foreign legal impediments] would have a vital bearing on
justification for dismissal of the action.").
185. See, e.g., Cochran Consulting, Inc. v. Uwatec USA, Inc., 102 F.3d 1224, 1227 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) (quoting Societe Internationale's discussion of bad faith); RNW Assocs. v.
Corporate Underwriters, Ltd., No. 93-6327, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 36229, at *8 (10th Cir.
Dec. 23, 1994) ("[T]o meet the good faith test, the party resisting discovery... must not
have deliberately courted legal impediments to the production of the documents." (internal
quotation marks omitted)); In re Westinghouse, 563 F.2d at 998 (noting that there was no
evidence of collusion by the ordered party and the foreign government in question); Banca
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Not all courts agree on what degree of collusion is necessary for a finding
of bad faith. As a result, even courts within the same circuit have reached
disparate decisions.18 7 A comparison of two decisions from the Southern
District of New York illustrates this point. In SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera
Italiana,a district judge set an extremely low bar for findings of bad faith.
In this case, the court addressed Banca Della Svizzera Italiana's (BSI)
refusal to provide the Securities and Exchange Commission with the
identities of the principals for whom it had purchased stock options
allegedly in violation of insider trading laws.18 8 BSI claimed that this
disclosure would violate foreign bank secrecy laws.' 89 The court held that
BSI's expectation of being shielded from liability in the United States by
foreign bank secrecy laws was enough to support a finding of bad faith:
A party's good or bad faith is an important factor to consider, and this
Court finds that BSI, which deposited the proceeds of these transactions
in an American bank account in its name and which certainly profited in
some measure from the challenged activity, undertook such transactions
fully expecting to use foreign law to shield it from the reach of our laws.
Such 'deliberate courting' of foreign legal impediments will not be
countenanced. 190

In Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., a district judge
employed a far more selective approach to bad faith. 191 The case concerned
a civil suit alleging a conspiracy to drive up the price of silver. 192 The
defendant sought documents from Banque Populaire Suisse (BPS)-a
193
settling defendant-to support his defense that BPS was the true culprit.
BPS refused to comply on the grounds that production would violate Swiss
bank secrecy laws. 194 After conducting its good faith analysis, the court
observed that BPS "may be viewed as having courted legal impediments to
production [of the requested documents and information]."' 19 5 The court
particularly criticized BPS's failure to secure secrecy waivers from certain
Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. at 119 (holding that the "'deliberate courting" of foreign
legal impediments will not be countenanced"); see also Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 388
F.3d 39, 60 (2d Cir. 2004) ("It is also well established, however, that orders of foreign courts
are not entitled to comity if the litigants who procure them have 'deliberately courted legal
impediments' to the enforcement of a federal court's orders.").
186. See Gen. Atomic Co. v. Exxon Nuclear Co., 90 F.R.D. 290, 299 (S.D. Cal. 1981)
("For [] conduct to amount to 'courting legal impediments' to production under [Societe
Internationale], it is not required that the actual litigation in which the documents are
ultimately ordered produced must be either pending or specifically contemplated at the time
the [collusive] policy was initiated and followed.").
187. For a detailed comparison of these cases see infra notes 188-97 and accompanying

text.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

See Banca Della Svizzera Italiana,92 F.R.D. at 112.
See id. at 113.
Id. at 118-19.
Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 118 F.R.D. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
See id. at 332.
See id.

194. See id.

195. Id. at 335 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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customers as mandated by relevant regulations and BPS's own internal
the court held that BPS's conduct did "not ris[e]
policies. 196 Nonetheless,1 97
to the level of bad faith."
b. Affirmative Good Faith Efforts
The Supreme Court's second step in its good faith analysis in Societe
Internationale was to assess whether Societe had "made diligent efforts to
execute the production order."' 198 The Court discussed but did not explicitly
endorse the test used by the special master at the district level: "[T]he test
of good faith [is] whether petitioner [has] attempted all which a reasonable
man would have undertaken in the circumstances to comply with the
99
order."1
Lower courts are in agreement that Societe Internationale requires
affirmative good faith acts on the part of the ordered party. 200 Some have
seized on the Supreme Court's use of the phrase "diligent effort" 20 1 as
establishing the good faith standard, 20 2 while others prefer the "reasonable
man" language of the special master.
As with bad faith, there is some disagreement among lower courts as to
what really qualifies as a "diligent effort" or "all which a reasonable man
would have undertaken." For example, some courts have found that the
ordered party must, at the very least, inquire into the scope of the foreign
law in question and the status of the requested documents to confirm that
production actually would violate foreign law. 20 3 Others expect the ordered
party to request permission from the foreign government to produce the
196. See id. ("Prior to litigation, BPS 1) engaged in transactions on the United States
silver market without securing secrecy waivers from its customers, as necessary for
[Commodity Exchange Act] reporting requirements and 2) granted [another defendant in this
suit] an exception to BPS' internal policies that required its customers, prior to trading on
U.S. markets, to execute bank secrecy waivers.").
197. Id. BPS's affirmative good faith efforts appear to have further persuaded the court
that BPS's courtship of foreign legal impediments did not rise to the level of bad faith. See
id. ("BPS has attempted to secure waivers of bank secrecy from its customers, it has
produced volumes of documents, and it has not relied on a sham law to refuse disclosure.").
198. Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales v. Rogers,
357 U.S. 197, 208 (1958).
199. Id. at 201.
200. See, e.g., In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992,
998 (10th Cir. 1977) (discussing the noncompliant party's affirmative good faith efforts).
201. Id.
202. Id. ("The record indicates that [the ordered party] has made diligent effort to produce
materials not subject to the [foreign] regulation.").
203. See, e.g., Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 570 F.2d 1370, 1373 (10th Cir. 1978)
(holding that Arthur Andersen's failure to investigate the status of the requested documents
and the law allegedly barring their production "places in substantial doubt.., that it had
proceeded in good faith to do the best it can" (internal quotation marks omitted)); United
States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 900 n.8 (2d Cir. 1968) (noting that the trial
judge "based his finding of lack of good faith on the fact that Citibank... had failed to even
make a simple inquiry into the nature or extent of the records available at the Frankfurt
branch").
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requested documents or to develop alternative means of disclosure. 20 4 For
example, in In re Westinghouse the Tenth Circuit found that the ordered
party's efforts to obtain permission from Canadian authorities to produce
restricted documents were "in the best of faith. '20 5 Consequently, the
20 6
Tenth Circuit held that sanctions for noncompliance were not justified.
It is unclear how courts should resolve situations where there is evidence
of both affirmative good faith acts and bad faith collusion. The U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of California confronted just such a
scenario in General Atomic Co. v. Exxon Nuclear Co. 2 0 7 In this matter,
General Atomic brought suit against Exxon to enforce a uranium
contract. 20 8 Exxon argued that the contract was null and void as violative
of U.S. antitrust law and counterclaimed against General Atomic for
antitrust damages for General Atomic's participation in an illegal uranium
cartel. 20 9 Exxon requested documents from General Atomic pertaining to
the cartel, but General Atomic refused to comply with the discovery orders
on the grounds that doing so would violate the Canadian Uranium
Information Security Regulations, subjecting General Atomic to criminal
2 10
penalties.
Initially, the court noted that, during the course of the instant lawsuit,
General Atomic had made "several good faith attempts to overcome the
prohibitions of the Security Regulations."'2 11 Specifically, General Atomic
retained Canadian legal counsel to explore ways around the regulations and
repeatedly, but unsuccessfully, petitioned the Canadian government for an
exemption. 212 General Atomic next appealed to the Canadian courts, filing
letters rogatory with the Supreme Court of Canada, again without
success. 2 13 The district court held that, together, these efforts constituted a
"prima facie showing of good faith to comply with the production
2 14
orders."
Nonetheless, the court found these good faith efforts were outweighed by
acts of bad faith taken prior to the litigation.2 15 According to the court,

204. See In re Westinghouse, 563 F.2d at 998; see also Trade Dev. Bank v. Cont'l Ins.
Co., 469 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1972) ("There remains the question of whether the district
court erred in not ordering the Bank... to make a good faith effort to obtain a waiver of that

restriction from the customers involved.").
205. In re Westinghouse, 563 F.2d at 998.
206. See id. at 999 ("A 'balancing' of all of these various factors leads us to conclude that
the trial court's order of contempt and the sanctions imposed in connection therewith are, on
the basis of the present record, not justified.").
207. 90 F.R.D. 290 (S.D. Cal. 1981).
208. See id. at 291.
209. See id. at 291-92.
210. See id. at 294.
211. Id.
212. See id. at 294-95.
213. See id. at 295.
214. Id.
215. See id. at 304 ("The destruction or disappearance of the [General Atomic] cartel
book when combined with [General Atomic's] housing of documents in Canada constitutes a
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shortly after joining the uranium cartel, General Atomic established a policy
of housing cartel-related documents at the offices of its Canadian subsidiary
so that the documents' "transmittal to the United States would be
avoided. '2 16 This "cartel concealment policy" also involved the transfer of
certain employees to the Canadian offices. 2 17 The court was further
troubled by General Atomic's lack of good faith in a related state suit 2 18
and the possibility that General Atomic had destroyed some relevant
documents. 2 19 These facts, when combined, led the court to conclude that
2 20
General Atomic had ultimately acted in bad faith.
2. The Significance of Good Faith
U.S. courts are divided on the significance of a party's showing of good
or bad faith in response to orders requiring violation of foreign law. This
disagreement is a critical one, given that, in some cases, a finding of good
or bad faith determines whether the court will sanction the noncompliant
party, regardless of the Restatements' balancing tests. Courts have adopted
three basic approaches in their treatment of good faith: (1) bad faith acts
require sanctions per se; (2) good faith acts make sanctions inappropriate
per se; (3) good or bad faith acts are a factor that courts should consider
22 1
when deciding whether sanctions are appropriate.

sufficient basis of fault under [Societe Internationale] to conclude that harsh sanctions
against [General Atomic] are not precluded.").
216. Id. at 296.
217. Id. ("Although [General Atomic] contends that the Gregg transfer to Toronto was for
sound business reasons, there is evidence that the purpose of the transfer was to implement
the cartel concealment policy.").
218. See id. at 299-300 ("By failing to provide cartel information prior to the passage of
the Canadian Uranium Information Security Regulations [in a New Mexico state case], and
then relying on these Regulations as an excuse for nonproduction, [General Atomic] is 'in
the position of having slain [its] parents and then pleading for mercy on the ground that [it]
is an orphan."').
219. See id. at 303 ("In addition to charging that Roger Allen shipped cartel-related
documents to Canada in 1972 to make them unavailable in anticipated litigation... Exxon
further claims that Gulf destroyed or altered cartel documents which had entered the United
States.").
220. See id. at 304.
221. The Restatement (Third) was aware of this split, though it offered no opinion on it:
As of 1987, the implications of the good faith requirement in the United States
were still evolving. Good faith efforts to secure release of information subject to
foreign secrecy laws will in some instances relieve a party or intermediary of
exposure to contempt sanctions.... In other instances, good faith effort to comply
will be taken into account in deciding whether to issue the order to produce the
information, and in framing such an order .... If the respondent does not meet the
test of good faith, some courts have taken the position that balancing of interest is
not required, and that sanctions for noncompliance, including heavy fines, should
be imposed.
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 442 reporter's note 8 (1987).
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a. The Bad Faith Approach: Bad Faith Acts Require Sanctions Per Se

A number of courts have taken the position that a party that fails to meet
the good faith standard must be sanctioned, regardless of the outcome of
either Restatement's balancing test.22 2 Essentially, under this Bad Faith
Approach, 223 bad faith acts preclude further analysis that might excuse
noncompliance. Since courts following this approach can end their analysis
faith efforts, they typically make good faith
after finding a lack of good
2 24
their first issue of inquiry.
General Atomic is an example of this approach. 225 In determining
whether General Atomic's noncompliance with the discovery orders
merited sanctions, the district court focused largely on good faith
analysis. 22 6 The court stated that sanctions would be appropriate for

noncompliance with an order requiring violation of foreign law where "(1)
the failure to fully comply with the production orders was caused by
'willfulness, bad faith, or any fault' of [General Atomic]; (2) the withheld

documents [are] crucial to the outcome of this litigation; (3) Exxon is
prejudiced by the failure of discovery in the presentation of its case; and (4)
the sanctions sought are commensurate with the prejudice to Exxon and the
degree of fault attributable to [General Atomic]. '22 7 Notably, aside from
considering the importance of the requested documents to the litigationone of the Restatement (Third)'s balancing factors-the court made no
reference to the restatements' balancing tests. 2 28 Instead, after concluding
that General Atomic had acted in bad faith, 22 9 and that the requested
222. See id.
223. For the purpose of clarity, this Note coins the terms "Bad Faith Approach," "Good
Faith Approach," and "Factor Approach" to denote the three main approaches to the
significance of an ordered party's good or bad faith acts in response to an order requiring
violation of foreign law.
224. See, e.g., Cochran Consulting, Inc. v. Uwatec USA, Inc., 102 F.3d 1224, 1228 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) ("Guided by the Supreme Court and the criteria of courts that have considered
similar issues, we start our analysis with the sound general rule that the person charged must
have made a good faith effort to comply with the discovery order."); Reinsurance Co. of Am.
v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 902 F.2d 1275, 1284 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring) ("[Under the Restatement (Third)], [a]s a rule, parties are entitled to seek
information and, without regardto balancingnationalinterests,the foreign party must make
a good faith effort to secure its release."); see also Montship Lines, Ltd. v. Fed. Mar. Bd.,
295 F.2d 147, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1961) ("Prior to determining whether these foreign laws do in
fact forbid the production of documents ... the appropriate procedure is to require these
petitioners to make a good faith attempt to obtain a waiver of such restrictions from their
respective governments."). Contrary to what the majority opinion in Cochran Consulting
claims, considering good faith efforts as a preliminary matter deviates from Supreme Court
precedent. See Societe Intemationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales v.
Rogers 357 U.S. 197 (1958) (analyzing good faith last).
225. Gen. Atomic Co. v. Exxon Nuclear Co., 90 F.R.D. 290 (S.D. Cal. 1981). For a
discussion of the facts of this case, see supra notes 207-20 and accompanying text.
226. Gen. Atomic, 90 F.R.D. at 294-99 (conducting a thorough examination of General
Atomic's good and bad faith acts).
227. Id. at 296.
228. The word "balancing" never appears in the opinion.
229. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
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documents were crucial to the litigation, 230 the court imposed sanctions on
General Atomic for noncompliance with an order requiring violation of
foreign law.231
Even though only a handful of courts explicitly endorse the Bad Faith
Approach,2 3 2 a far greater number appear to follow it in practice:
Generally, courts will impose sanctions against a party that
acts in bad faith
2 33
in response to an order requiring violation of foreign law.
The rationale for the Bad Faith Approach is that it minimizes reliance on
balancing tests while nonetheless ensuring that courts will pressure parties
234
to comply with production orders without actually violating foreign law.
In the words of Judge Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit, "Such an
approach is a careful accommodation of the legitimate interests of the
parties and the nations alike, all without authorizing unconfined 'balancing'
235
of the 'importance' of the nations' policies."
The Bad Faith Approach, however, does not entirely circumvent the
balancing tests. If the ordered party makes a good faith effort to comply but
nonetheless fails to comply fully, courts following this approach conduct a
236
balancing test to determine whether sanctions are appropriate.
230. See Gen. Atomic, 90 F.R.D. at 307 ("The withheld documents are relevant and
crucial to a fair trial.").
231. See id. at 309. The court did not impose the sanction of dismissal and default
judgment as Exxon requested, but rather stated that it would sanction General Atomic by
presuming that certain of Exxon's allegations were true subject to rebuttal. See id.
232. See, e.g., Cochran Consulting, Inc. v. Uwatec USA, Inc., 102 F.3d 1224, 1226-27
(Fed. Cir. 1996) ("[T]o avoid sanctions the party that is unable to comply with a valid
discovery request must have acted in good faith."); Reinsurance Co. of Am. v. Administratia
Asigurarilor de Stat, 902 F.2d 1275, 1283 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J., concurring); Gen.
Atomic, 90 F.R.D. at 296.
233. See, e.g., RNW Assocs., Inc. v. Corporate Underwriters, Ltd., No. 93-6327, 1994
U.S. App. LEXIS 36229, at *8-9 (10th Cir. Dec. 23, 1994) (affirming sanctions where
ordered party did not act in good faith in response to an order requiring violation of foreign
law); Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1479 (9th Cir. 1992)
(same); United States v. Bank of N.S., 740 F.2d 817, 825-26 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (affirming a
$25,000 per day fine against a bank that demonstrated a "lack of good faith" in response to
an order requiring violation of foreign law); United States v. Bank of N.S., 691 F.2d 1384,
1389 (11 th Cir. 1982) (affirming civil contempt sanctions against a party that "had not made
a good faith effort to comply" with an order requiring violation of foreign law); United
States v. Vetco, Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1287 n.6 (9th Cir. 1981) (affirming sanctions where
ordered party acted in bad faith by conducting "one of the greatest delaying actions [in]
recent memory" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 570
F.2d 1370, 1376 (10th Cir. 1978) (affirming monetary sanctions against a party that acted in
"flagrant bad faith" in response to an order requiring violation of foreign law); Remington
Prods., Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Corp., 107 F.R.D. 642, 644 (D. Conn. 1985) (imposing
sanctions on a party whose refusal to provide discovery was in bad faith); see also SEC v.
Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 118-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (enforcing an order
requiring violation of foreign law against a party that acted in bad faith, but reserving the
issue of sanctions to give the ordered party another chance to comply).
234. See Reinsurance Co. ofAm., 902 F.2d at 1284 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
235. Id. Judge Easterbrook was discussing his interpretation of the Restatement (Third),
which closely resembles the Bad Faith Approach. Id.
236. See Cochran Consulting, 102 F.3d at 1227 ("In considering whether to sanction nonproduction the court must seek a fair balance of the interests and litigation needs of the
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b. The Good Faith Approach: Good Faith Acts
Make Sanctions InappropriatePer Se

Under the Good Faith Approach, good faith acts make sanctions
inappropriate per se. A limited number of courts expressly endorse this
approach. 2 37 Nevertheless, some courts appear to follow the Good Faith

Approach in practice:

Courts generally do not impose sanctions against

parties that have acted in good faith in response to orders requiring
238
violation of foreign law.
There are several rationales for the Good Faith Approach. First, it greatly

reduces reliance on the restatements' balancing tests. Second, this approach
meets the Restatement (Third)'s goal of "not ordinarily impos[ing]
sanctions" when a party has made a good faith effort to comply. 239 Third, it
comports with the spirit of Societe Internationale,at least for commentators
who view that case as "aim[ing] to vindicate the good faith custodian from
'240
the dilemma caused by a legal conflict between two sovereigns.
A number of courts have criticized the Good Faith Approach. These
critics point out that Societe Internationale did not hold that good faith
efforts always excuse compliance with a production order requiring
violation of foreign law, only that they excuse compliance under the
24 1
specific facts of that case.
c. The FactorApproach: Good or Bad Faith Acts Are a Factor to
Consider When Determining Whether SanctionsAre Appropriate
Under the Factor Approach, courts treat a party's good or bad faith acts
as another factor in their balancing test. This approach is prevalent in the
Second Circuit, particularly in the Southern District of New York. 242 In
parties ....
");Reinsurance Co. of Am., 902 F.2d at 1284 (Easterbrook, J.,concurring) ("[A]
court or agency may, in appropriate cases, make findings of fact adverse to a party that has
failed to comply with the order for production, even if that party has made a good faith effort
to secure permission from the foreign authorities to make the information available and that
effort has been unsuccessful.").
237. See, e.g., Richmark Corp., 959 F.2d at 1479 ("It is true that contempt is
inappropriate where a party has taken 'all the reasonable steps' it can take to comply.").
238. See, e.g., Societe Intemationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 208-12 (1958) (refusing to impose sanctions against an ordered party
that acted in good faith); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d
992, 998-99 (10th Cir. 1977) (same); In re Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz, 93 F.R.D. 840, 843
(N.D. Ill. 1982) (refusing to impose harsh sanctions, but reserving the right to make adverse
inferences, against the noncompliant party that acted in good faith).
239. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 442(2)(b) (1987).
240. See Brodeur, supra note 16, at 591.
241. See Remington Prods., Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Corp., 107 F.R.D. 642, 647 (D. Conn.
1985) ("[In Societe Internationale,] [t]he Court did not hold that no sanctions were
appropriate where good faith inability to comply is shown."); In re Westinghouse, 563 F.2d
at 1002 (Doyle, J.,dissenting) ("[T]he Supreme Court did not hold that good faith justified
avoiding [production].").
242. See, e.g., Reino de Espana v. Am. Bureau of Shipping, 03 Civ. 3573, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15685, at * 1 0 - 1 1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2005) (listing the ordered party's good faith as
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Reino de Espana v. American Bureau of Shipping, for example, the district
court simply listed "the good faith of the party resisting discovery" as the
final factor in the Second Circuit's four-part balancing test. 243 Similarly,
the district court in Banca Della Svizzera Italiana treated good faith as if it
were actually an aspect of the hardship factor of the Restatement (Second)'s
balancing test.

244

The rationale for the Factor Approach is a desire to leave the issue of
sanctions to the courts' discretion rather than forcing courts to employ a per
se rule. This desire is drawn from the permissive language of the
Restatement (Third).24 5
Theoretically, given this discretion, courts
employing the Factor Approach could impose sanctions on a party that
acted in good faith or refuse to impose sanctions on a party that acted in bad
faith. Such outcomes are possible due to the role of the other factors in the
balancing test. For example, a court using the Factor Approach could find
that the U.S. interest at stake is so vital that this factor would outweigh the
ordered party's good faith efforts to comply. In such a case, the court could

impose sanctions notwithstanding the ordered party's good faith acts.
Conversely, a court using the Factor Approach might find that the foreign
interest at stake is so vital that the court could refuse to sanction a
246
noncompliant party that acted in bad faith.

one of four factors to be considered under the Second Circuit's balancing test); Minpeco,
S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 116 F.R.D. 517, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (same); SEC v.
Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (considering the ordered
party's good faith alongside the Restatement (Second)'s hardship factor). Some other courts
have followed the Second Circuit in viewing good faith as a factor to be weighed before
imposing sanctions. See Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, 231 F.R.D. 538, 543 (N.D. Ill. 2004)
("The failure of a party raising a foreign law defense ... to make [a] good faith effort is a
factor that may be considered in requiring production despite the conflict with foreign
law.").
243. Reino de Espana, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15685, at *10-11. The Second Circuit's
balancing test is derived from the Restatement (Second)'s test and, besides the ordered
party's good faith, considers: "(1) the competing interests of the nations whose laws are in
conflict, (2) the hardship of compliance on the party or witness from whom discovery is
sought, (3) the importance to the litigation of the information and documents requested ...
Id. (citing Minpeco, 116 F.R.D. at 522).
244. See Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. at 118 (merging hardship and good
faith analysis).
245. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 442(1)(b) (1987) ("Failure to
comply with an order to produce information may subject the person... to sanctions .... ")
(emphasis added); Id. § 442(2)(b) ("A court or agency should not ordinarily impose
sanctions .... ).
246. Other commentators have observed this possibility as well. See Browne, supra note
16, at 1341 (noting that under the approach used in Banca Della Svizzera Italiana,"a finding
of a less compelling United States interest on balance [would] preclude sanctions even
absent a showing of good faith"). Browne suggests that the converse is not true: "If good
faith had been shown, however, Societe Internationale would preclude an imposition of
sanctions even if the [other balancing factors] supported imposition of sanctions." Id. It is
unclear, however, that Societe Internationale always precludes the imposition of sanctions
where the ordered party acts in good faith. See supra note 241 and accompanying text. As
such, it appears that both outcomes are possible.
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C. InternationalCooperation

The United States has been able to circumvent the problems posed by
orders requiring violation of foreign law, to a certain extent, through formal

and informal international agreements.
1. Formal International Agreements on Evidence Gathering
Recognizing that conflicts between U.S. court orders and foreign law
have far-reaching foreign-relations implications, 24 7 the political branches of
the U.S. government have tried to diffuse the potential for friction through

formal international agreements. 2 48 Such agreements generally provide for
mutual assistance in the collection of evidence in a manner acceptable to all

parties. The most prominent of these agreements is the Hague Convention
on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters (Hague
Convention), 24 9 which governs extraterritorial evidence gathering in "civil
and commercial matters." 250 The Hague Convention, to which the United

States is a signatory, assists U.S.-based parties-including the U.S.
government-in acquiring evidence that might otherwise be inaccessible,
while protecting foreign states from what they consider "the limitless scope
25
of U.S.-style pretrial discovery." '
The Supreme Court, however, has severely limited the Hague
Convention's efficacy. 252 In Socit Nationale Industrielle A~rospatiale v.
United States District Courtfor the Southern District of Iowa, the Supreme

Court held that the Hague Convention's procedures are merely an optional
alternative to traditional orders of production. 253 The Court's 5-4 decision

247. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 442 reporter's note 1 (1987)
("No aspect of the extension of the American legal system beyond the territorial frontier of
the United States has given rise to so much friction as the requests for documents in
investigation and litigation in the United States.").
248. See generally ABA Section of Antitrust Law, supra note 115; David McClean,
International Co-operation in Civil and Criminal Matters (2002).
249. The Hague Convention and the Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory are
the only international agreements pertaining to the conduct of discovery in foreign
jurisdictions that the United States has ratified. See ABA Section of Antitrust Law, supra
note 115, at 27. The United States has also ratified the Inter-American Convention on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, which requires mutual assistance in the "transmittal
of documents, reports, information, and evidence" related to criminal investigations.
McClean, supra note 248, at 223.
250. Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial
Matters, art. 1, openedfor signatureMar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231.
251. See ABA Section of Antitrust Law, supra note 115, at 30.
252. See Martin A. Rogoff, Interpretation of International Agreements by Domestic
Courts and the Politics of International Treaty Relations: Reflections on Some Recent
Decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 11 Am. U.J. Int'l & Pol'y 559, 602 (1996)
(noting that "the Court's decision has been almost universally condemned"); see generally
Patricia A. Kuhn, Comment, Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale: The Supreme
Court's Misguided Approach to the Hague Evidence Convention, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 1011
(1989) (discussing the Supreme Court's quasi-nullification of the Hague Convention).
253. See Soci~t6 Nationale Industrielle A~rospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522
(1987).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

was based largely on its finding that the "plain language of the Convention"
made clear that its procedures were neither exclusive nor mandatory. 2 54 In
his dissent, Justice Harry Blackmun observed that the Hague Convention
"provides effective discovery procedures that largely eliminate the conflicts
between United States and foreign law on evidence gathering. '2 55 As such,
he argued that there should be a "general presumption that, in most cases,
courts should resort first to the [Hague] Convention procedures. '256 Justice
Blackmun made it clear that he preferred the Hague Convention's
procedures to the continued use of either restatement's "case-by-case
257
comity analysis."
2. Informal International Cooperation
The United States has also taken advantage of informal methods of
obtaining evidence abroad. Such methods have obvious advantages, but
may present legal problems. According to Professors Bruce Zagaris and
Jessica Resnick, "Informal requests usually secure assistance more quickly
and flexibly than formal ones, but they do not always conform to the
'258
Federal Rules of Evidence.
The U.S. Department of Justice has identified six methods of obtaining
evidence abroad through informal means:
(1) persuading foreign
authorities to gather evidence and share it with their U.S. counterparts as
part of a joint investigation; 259 (2) requesting documents through diplomatic
channels; 260 (3) taking depositions from voluntary witnesses at U.S.
embassies and consulates; 26 1 (4) making a "treaty-type request that, even
though no treaty is in force, the requested country decides to execute"; 262
(5) making police-to-police requests through U.S. federal law enforcement
agents working abroad; 263 and (6) making a request through INTERPOL. 264
254. Id. at 529.
255. Id. at 548 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 548-49.
257. Specifically, Justice Blackmun wrote:
The Court ignores the importance of the Convention by relegating it to an
"optional" status, without acknowledging the significant achievement in
accommodating divergent interests that the Convention represents. Experience to
date indicates that there is a large risk that the case-by-case comity analysis now to
be permitted by the Court, will be performed inadequately and that the somewhat
unfamiliar procedures of the Convention will be invoked infrequently.
Id. at 548.
258. Bruce Zagaris & Jessica Resnick, The Mexico-U.S. Mutual Legal Assistance in
Criminal Matters Treaty: Another Step Toward the Harmonization of International Law

Enforcement, 14 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 1, 10 (1997).
259. See id.
260. See id.
261. See id.

262. Id. at 11. According to Bruce Zagaris and Jessica Resnick, "This is what happened
during the investigation of the murder of U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent
Enrique Camarena, which took place in Mexico. Although [no mutual assistance legal treaty
was in place], the United States and Mexico cooperated as if there was a treaty." Id.
263. See id.
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Though formal and informal agreements on information and evidence
sharing are widely used, they have not eliminated legal conflicts arising out
of orders that require violation of foreign law. Consequently, the need for a
well-reasoned approach to such orders is as pressing today as it was at the
time the Supreme Court decided Societe Internationale.
III. MAKING GOOD OR BAD FAITH ACTS DETERMINATIVE AND THE
CONSEQUENCES FOR U.S. INFORMATION-GATHERING EFFORTS

The best approach to orders requiring violation of foreign law is one in
which the ordered party's good or bad faith acts, and not a balancing test,
determine the party's fate. Part III.A explains how such an approach works
and suggests that a number of courts already use it implicitly. Part II.B
concludes that a court employing this approach likely would have excused
SWIFT's noncompliance with U.S. subpoenas. In light of the difficulty of
unilaterally gathering information, Part III.C encourages the United States
to employ both formal and informal information-sharing agreements with
its allies in the war on terror.
A. The Good or Bad FaithActs of a Noncompliant Party Orderedto
ProduceMaterials in Violation of Foreign Law Should Determine Whether
Sanctions Are Appropriate
The proper approach to orders requiring violation of foreign law must
follow the spirit of the Supreme Court's holding in Societe Internationale
while minimizing reliance on unworkable balancing tests. Sanctioning an
ordered party for noncompliance based solely on the party's good or bad
faith acts accomplishes both goals. This approach essentially merges the
2 65
Bad Faith Approach with the Good Faith Approach.
In Societe Internationale,the Supreme Court recognized that "inability to
comply because of foreign law" could be a valid excuse for noncompliance
with a production order. 26 6 The Court found that the sanction of dismissal
was improper since the "failure to comply [with a production order was]
due to inability, and not to willfulness, bad faith or any fault of
[Societe]. '267 The Court was further impressed by Societe's affirmative
good faith efforts to produce the documents. 268 In the end, the Court
protected Societe because Societe acted in good faith. 269 By making a
noncompliant party's good or bad faith acts determine whether sanctions
are appropriate, lower courts will honor the Supreme Court's desire to
vindicate parties that act in good faith.

264. See id.
265. See supra Part II.B.2.a-b.
266. Societe Intemationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales v. Rogers,
357 U.S. 197, 212 (1958).
267. Id.
268. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
269. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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This approach to good faith will greatly reduce reliance on the
restatements' balancing tests. A court will impose sanctions regardless of
any balancing if it finds that a party has acted in bad faith or failed to make
sufficient affirmative efforts to produce the requested materials.
Conversely, a court will not impose sanctions regardless of any balancing if
it finds that a party has made sufficient affirmative efforts to produce the
requested materials and has not acted in bad faith.
Reducing reliance on the restatements' balancing tests is desirable given
that they have proven largely unworkable. 2 70 The tests have numerous
shortcomings, but the most egregious is their assumption that courts can
fairly and meaningfully balance U.S. interests against those of foreign
nations. 27 1 Although courts have gamely applied these tests, they have
protested while doing so, 2 72 and with good reason, considering that the
273
restatements' tests have yielded unsatisfactory results.
Arguably, this approach simply makes explicit what courts have done in
practice. Even when courts nominally use the restatements' balancing tests
to determine the propriety of sanctions, they rarely sanction a party acting
in good faith or fail to sanction a party acting in bad faith. The approach
endorsed by this Note would simply streamline courts' reasoning,
eliminating extraneous factor balancing.
B. Application to the SWIFT Program
Prior to the U.S.-E.U. Compromise, SWIFT was faced with the dilemma
of deciding whether to comply with U.S. or Belgian and E.U. law. 274 At
the time, it seemed unlikely that the United States would drag SWIFT into
court to enforce its subpoenas. Such a drastic step undoubtedly would have
estranged European allies, not to mention SWIFT executives who had been
extremely cooperative up to that point. However, if the United States did
have the legal authority to demand that SWIFT continue to comply with its
subpoenas, it would have had a much stronger position during the
compromise negotiations. If the cost of compromise ever became too high,
the United States could have threatened to abandon negotiations in favor of
continuing the program unchanged.
Given the muddled nature of case law on orders requiring violation of
foreign law, it is difficult to say whether the United States could have
enforced the SWIFT Program's subpoenas in a U.S. court. This is
principally because the balancing tests of both the Restatement (Second)
and the Restatement (Third) yield unpredictable results. 2 75 On the one
hand, a court employing either of these tests could find that the United
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States' interest in tracking terrorist financing tipped the scales in favor of
compelling SWIFT to disclose its financial records. 276 On the other hand, a
court could reach the opposite conclusion or could even decline to
277
undertake the balancing at all.
What is clear, however, is that SWIFT acted in the best of faith once it
found itself caught between conflicting legal obligations. First, SWIFT did
not court the foreign legal impediments that led to the conflict. Second, it
took numerous affirmative steps to try to remedy the situation, such as
trying to convince Belgian and E.U. officials that its disclosures under the
SWIFT Program were legal under all relevant laws. 2 78 Third, the fact that
279
SWIFT complied with SWIFT Program subpoenas for five years,
enabling tens of thousands of searches to be conducted, 280 strongly supports
a finding of good faith.
The significance of this finding would vary from court to court. Courts
employing the Good Faith Approach 2 81 or the approach advocated in Part
III.A of this Note would excuse SWIFT's noncompliance based on
SWIFT's good faith acts. Courts employing the Bad Faith Approach 28 2 or
the Factor Approach 283 would turn to one of the restatements' balancing
tests to determine whether sanctions were appropriate. In theory, they
might find that SWIFT's good faith was outweighed by other factors that
favored disclosure.
C. The United States Should Take GreaterAdvantage of
Informal Information-SharingAgreements
Whether or not courts adopt this Note's approach to orders requiring
violation of foreign law, the United States should recognize that it has
limited power to gather information abroad. Formal agreements like the
U.S.-E.U. Compromise reinforce these limitations in that they often require
the United States to make substantial concessions. 2 84 As such, it is
imperative that the United States take greater advantage of informal
information-sharing agreements, which are relatively more flexible.
Informal agreements between U.S. administrative agencies-such as the
Treasury, Department of Justice, National Security Agency, or Central
Intelligence Agency-and their E.U. counterparts may be particularly
helpful given the ease with which they can be instituted. 28 5 Such
arrangements could supplement the information that the United States
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gathers through the modified SWIFT Program. For example, a Belgian
investigative agency, in theory, would be able to access SWIFT's financial
database without raising the same privacy concerns as the SWIFT
Program. 2 86 They could then share this information with the relevant U.S.
agency through a joint investigation. 28 7 Such an arrangement might enable
the United States to access the financial data of individuals who are linked
to terrorist activities only after the United States has deleted their data in
288
accordance with the U.S.-E.U. Compromise.
CONCLUSION

When confronted with orders requiring violation of foreign law, U.S.
courts should sanction a noncompliant party based only on the party's good
or bad faith acts. This approach meets the Supreme Court's goal of
vindicating parties that act in good faith while reducing reliance on
unworkable balancing tests. Under this approach, SWIFT, which acted in
the best of faith after receiving U.S. subpoenas under the SWIFT Program,
would have been immune from sanctions for noncompliance. Though the
U.S.-E.U. Compromise largely diffused this thorny legal issue, the United
States should also pursue more informal-and more flexible-informationsharing agreements with its European allies.
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